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I. INTRODUCTION
Significant attention has focused on the "Odious Debt Doctrine"'
(ODD), which espouses that a population should not be burdened with
debt incurred by a previous regime when lending did not benefit the
population. 2 Despite acclaim, the doctrine's compelling nature, and
innovative approaches proffered, no creditor state legislative initiatives
emerged.3 Addressing the recognized impediment to developing a
functional standard,4 this Article emphasizes an analytical framework
with three fundamental elements-(l) a government unreasonably
breached fiduciary obligations to the populace or externalities
compromised that fiduciary relationship (2) by contracting for loans
with locus and disbursement defects, and (3) agreements caused adverse
consequences, including of a systemic or macroeconomic nature.5
Two inferences flow from this test. First, the ODD is inescapably

* MA Political Science (Michigan), MA Applied Economics (Michigan), LL.M.
International Law (Georgetown). The author has taught courses in International Law at Cooley
Law School and for the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan, courses
in American Government and Constitutional Law at Alma College, and courses in Business Law
at Central Michigan University and the University of Miami.
1. Sabine Michalowski & Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, Transitional Justice and Other
Trends of the Debate on the Odious Debts: A Response to the World Bank Discussion Paperon
Odious Debts, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 59 (2009); Christiana Ochoa, From Odious Debt to
Odious Finance: Avoiding the Externalities of a FunctionalOdious Debt Doctrine, 49 HARv.
INT'L L.J. 109, 118-19 (2008); Odette Lienau, Who is the "Sovereign" in Sovereign Debt?:
Reinterpreting a Rule-of-Law Framework from the Early Twentieth Century, 33 YALE J. INT'L
L. 63 (2008); Lee C. Buchheit et al., The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L.J. 1201, 1203
(2007); Adam Feibelman, Contract,Priority,and Odious Debt, 85 N.C. L. REv. 727 (2007); Jeff
A. King, Odious Debt: The Terms of the Debate, 32 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 605 (2007);
Jonathan Shafter, The Due Diligence Model: An Executive Approach to Odious Debt Reform, 32
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 669 (2007); Patrick Bolton & David Skeel, Odious Debts or
Odious Regimes?, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (2007); Alan Gelpem, What Iraq and
Argentina Might Learn from Each Other, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 391 (2005); Christoph G. Paulus,
Odious Debts' vs. Debt Trap: A Realistic Help?, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 83 (2005); Noreena
Hertz, Why We Must Defuse the Debt Threat, 24 CONTRIBUTIONS TO POL. EcoN. 123 (2005);

Anupam Chander, Odious Securitization, 53 EMORY L.J. 923 (2004).
2. Ochoa, supra note 1, at 109.
3. See, e.g., Feibelman, supra note 1, at 747 ("There seems to be broad agreement that
sovereigns should not incur odious debt and that, ideally, successor regimes should not be
required to repay such debt. But there are serious practical challenges to implementing any of
the [proposed] doctrines or institutions . . . ."); Shafter, supra note 1, at 672.
4. See Feibelman, supra note 1, at 747. A World Bank discussion paper (2008) might
have otherwise been influential, but one critique called it a "biased and incomplete picture of the
discussion of odious debts by focusing on a few partial aspects of the debate and taking them
out of context." Michalowski & Bohoslavsky, supra note 1, at 63; see generally infra Part V.
5. Element 1 is predominantly discussed in Part IV and element 3 is addressed in Part
III. Element 2 overlaps with analyses in Parts III and IV.
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formulated as a sub-issue of globalization 6 that invokes the nexus
between developing and transitioning state debt that still heatedly line
the financial pages and common "complaints about the United States,
foreign bankers, [and] foreign corporations." 8 Second, because the
formulation is grounded in general contract and treaty law, there should
be deeper inquiry into the aggrieved party and burden of action.9 In
1992, Dean Jon Sylvester criticized the prevailing perspective of the
developing world debt crisis by explaining that "[t]he imposition of
conditions on debt relief makes clear that debt relief is generally viewed
as a concession, or perhaps merely a favor, to the debtor."10 For many
countries, prevalent ODD circumstances ostensibly evolved from that
debt crisis and the dominant lens of creditors needing to initiate a
"favor" of debt relief remains." Alternatively, appropriate circumstances, legal doctrines, and particulars might entitle sovereigns to
affirmatively challenge odious debt or oblige creditors to be more
pliable during debt reduction negotiations. Under this scenario, if
creditors seek repayment and courts accept jurisdiction, debt legitimacy
can be determined by considering relevant contract law, equity, and
international law principles.' 3

6. Larry Cata Backer, Ideologies of Globalization and Sovereign Debt: Cuba and the
IMF, 24 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 497, 499 (2006).
7. Lienau, supra note 1, at 63; see also Conference Report, Alliance of Liberals and
Democrats for Europe (ALDE), The International Financial Crisis: It's Causes and What to do
About It? (Feb. 27, 2008), http://www.alde.eu/fileadmin/wedocs/key docs/Finance-bookEN.
pdf [hereinafter ALDE] (European Parliament member inquiry and meetings); Rachel Ordu,
Debt and the Realization of Economic and Social Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa: Beyond Debt
Relief to Solutions in the Common Interest, 3 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTs. L. REv. 229, 265
(2008).
8. Anupam Chander, Globalizationand Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1193, 1197-98 (2005).
9. See infra note 10; infra Part V (considering equities amid existing contract and
international law doctrines and postulating that given specific circumstances, presumed validity
of financial obligation might not always be considered the status quo).
10. Jon H. Sylvester, Impracticability, Mutual Mistake and Related ContractualBasesfor
Equitable Adjusting the External Debt of Sub-SaharanAfrica, 13 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 258,
260 (1992), available at http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1024&
context-pubs.
11. See infra notes 64-79; see generally infra Parts III, V.
12. See infra Parts V, VI.
13. See infra PartV.
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II. FRAMING APPROPRIATE ODD CIRCUMSTANCES

A. CorporateForm and Sovereign Borrowing
As a vignette to amassing debt consequences in Part III and the
"odious agent" element in Part IV, the analysis commences by
comparing sovereign lending with the more familiar framework of
corporate lending. As a contractual relationship that produces new
rights and obligations,14 a loan involves a creditor extending current
financial value in exchange for a debtor's promise to repay principal
with an interest rate that incorporates the estimated risk and time value
of money." Officials contract, accept loans, and fund specific causes for
a borrowing entity.16 Domestic law confers a perpetual person status to
a properly-chartered corporation irrespective of director, executive, and
managerial changes;1 7 and international law provides the framework for
the international community to accord dejure recognition to the state.' 8
The core contractual agreement and risk-reducing person status make
sovereign borrowing analogous to corporate borrowing,19 but there are
marked distinctions in the parties in interest, prescriptive jurisdiction for
breach, and agent oversight.
A corporation has three main actors-the Board of Directors and
executive leadership who are policymaking agents; management and
employees who implement policymaker directives; and the
shareholders/principal who elects the first actor.20 Sovereigns have three
main actors-the political leadership/agent, which may attain power via
election or otherwise; the bureaucracy, which may be relatively stable
or undergo drastic political shifts depending on political appointment
processes; and the populace, which is the ultimate principal/party-ininterest. 2 1 The corporate governance interrelationship is bound by a
14.

See Robert Bejesky, The Evolution in andInternational Convergence of the Doctrine

of Specific Performance in Three Types of States, 13 IND. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 353, 360

(2003).
I5.

CFM42060-DeemedLoan Relationships: DisguisedInterest: Returns 'Economically

Equivalent to Interest,' HER MAJESTY'S REVENUE & CUSTOMS,

http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/

manuals/cfmmanual/cfm42060.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
16. See infra Part IV.A.
17.

REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT

§ 3.02

(1984).

18. See infra Part IV.A.
19. Shafter, supra note 1, at 672 (There are similarities between corporate structure and
government fiduciary responsibilities, as they relate to loan contracts, which opens an abundant
jurisprudence and "Private Law models" involving creditor and debtor relations).
20.

ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 4 (4th ed. 2008).

21. Sanjay K. Pandey & Bradley E. Wright, Connecting the Dots in Public Management:
Political Environment, Organizational Goal Ambiguity, and the Public Manager's Role
Ambiguity, 16 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. THEORY 511 (2006) (identifying dominance of democratic

control theory over bureaucratic action).
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well-defined mission to achieve a financial condition that maximizes
shareholder value, 22 but government borrowing intentions and spending
measures can span a Left/Right-wing continuum and produce appeased
and chagrined populace percentages.
For sovereigns, contemporary rules and practices generally presume
that when the authorized government agent accepts a loan, the debt
continues with state and government succession 4 without assessing
whether citizens were endowed with value from loans. 25 Valueless or
non-beneficial loans might have left the citizenry with a repayment
obligation. 26 Controversial lon2aefnacdawr
loans may have financed a war, funded
weapon gurchases to abuse populations,28 or corruptly delighted regime
loyalists. 9 A World Bank opinion questions the validity of "loans that
do not reach their developmental purpose," and "loans directly linked to
capital flight." 30 Alternatively, desirable lending may have allocated
value by investing in infrastructure projects; 3 1 provided an economic
22. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Regulating Multinational Corporations: Towards Principles of
Cross-BorderLegal Frameworks in a Globalized World BalancingRights and Responsibilities,
23 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 451, 496-97 (2008); see also Milton Friedman, The Social
Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 13, 1970),
available at www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertarians/issues/friedman-soc-resp-business.
html (increasing profits is "the one and only social responsibility of business"). Corporations
may borrow to overcome economic cycles, fund R&D, overcome losses, or attain a tax-optimal
debt/equity ratio.
23. In the United States, Republicans and Democrats have different political preferences
and will urge taxing and spending measures in a manner consistent with those preferences. See
generally Alan Abramowitz & Kyle Saunders, Why Can't We All Just Get Along? The Reality of
a PolarizedAmerica, 3 FORUM (2005), http://www.dartmouth.edu/-govt/docs/Abramowitz.pdf.
24. See infra Parts IV.A-B, IV.D. 1.
25. Buchheit et al., supra note 1, at 1208-20; Feibelman, supra note 1, at 731.
26. Buchheit et al., supra note 1, at 1211-12.
27. King, supra note 1, at 627-28.
28. Louis A. Pdrez, Jr. & Deborah M. Weissman, Public Power and Private Purpose:
Odious Debt and the PoliticalEconomy of Hegemony, 32 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 699,
701-02 (2007).
29. Gross breaches of principal/agent corporate relations include embezzlement, theft,
other white-collar crimes, and misuse of funds. Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco scandals highlight
that corporate governance does not always fulfill obligations to shareholders even within stable
legal systems. Joseph Heath, The Uses and Abuses of Agency Theory, 19 Bus. ETHICS Q. 497,
497-98 (Oct. 2009), http://secure.pdcnet.org/8525737F005803FF/file/ F5469EB762BE8495852
5762400506D96/$FILE/beq2009_0019 0004_00310062.pdf. Equivalent government/citizenry breach of trust violations can involve blatant kleptocratic rule, peculating public accounts,
imprudent spending to maintain power, and perhaps overspending that leaves unsustainable
accounts. Jakob Svensson, Eight Questions About Corruption, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 19, 20-21
(2005), http://people.su.se/~jsven/8questions.pdf.
30. Michalowski & Bohoslavsky, supra note 1, at 102.
31. Buchheit et al., supra note 1, at 1210-11. Lending may be collateralized by project or
commodity. See also Scott L. Hoffman, A Practical Guide to TransactionalProject Finance:
Basic Concepts, Risk Identification, and ContractualConsiderations, 45 Bus. L. 181 (1989);
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stimulus; financed imports of capital, foreign services, or consumer
goods; or bestowed other private or public sector benefits with
constituent appeal. 32
Certain variables make the potential to violate principal rights higher
and less remediable with governments. For corporations in stable
economies, laws prohibit management from misrepresenting
information relevant to a corporation's financial condition and prevent
"propagandizing" shareholders. 3 3 A corporation's policymakers cannot
surreptitiously classify relevant facts under national security, wield
force to demand shareholder obeisance, and need not fear the risk of
coup. Contrarily, sovereign governments have the sole legal authority to
wield force within a country and have varying degrees of control over
political dialog, courts, institutions, and dispute enforcement procedures. 34 While borrowing by former dictatorS35 may flag suspicion
since relative palatability of political leaders is presumably higher in
democracies,36 even democracies can be prone to profligacy and debt
accumulation without much accountability.
Wendy Duong, Partnershipswith Monarchs - Two Case Studies: Case One Partnershipswith
Monarchs in Search for Oil: Unveiling and Re-Examining the Patterns of "Third World"
Economic Development in the Petroleum Sector, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 1171, 1211-16
(2004).
32.

SHARI

SPIEGEL,

U.N.

DEPARTMENT

OF

ECONOMIC

AND

SOCIAL

AFFAIRS,

MACROECONOMIC AND GROWTH POLICIES, 6-7, 14-16 (2007), http://esa.un.org/techcoop/
documents/PNMacroGrowthPolicyNote.pdf (explaining that countries borrow or purchase on
credit for a multitude of macroeconomic reasons).
33. See Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Practices, 17 C.F.R § 240.10b-5
(2009).
34. See ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 44 (1998).
35. See, e.g., Seema Jayachandran & Michael Kremer, Odious Debt, 96 AM. EcoN. REV.
82, 85-87 (2006); Joseph Stiglitz, Odious Rulers, Odious Debts, ATLANTIC MONTHLY 39 (Nov.
2003).
36. DAHL, supra note 34, at 46.
37. See, e.g., Buchheit et al., supra note 1, at 1211; Robert Bejesky, PoliticoInternational Law, 57 Loy. L. REv. 29, 56-63 (2011) [hereinafter Bejesky, PoliticoInternationalLaw]. For example, for per capita deficits, Iraq's prewar debt was approximately
$116 billion for 25 million people ($4,640 per capita), while U.S. debt currently exceeds $10
trillion for 300 million people ($33,000 per capita), with 80% aggregating during the Reagan,
Bush Sr., and Bush Jr. administrations. Id. at 62; see infra Part II.C. Tax bases in rich countries
can more easily finance deficits, but there are surprising transnational effects. See JOSEPH E.
STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 245 (2007). For example, of Mr. Bush's debt, Stiglitz
writes: "The global financial system is not working well .... Money is flowing uphill, from the
poor to the rich.. .. [T]he United States ... borrow[s] $2 billion a day from poorer countries."
Id. One reason deficits increased during the Reagan administration was due to increased military
spending to confront portrayals of security threats. Richard Delgado, The Language of the Arms
Race: Should the People Limit Government Speech?, 64 B.U. L. REV. 961, 973, 979-81 (1984);
GREG GRANDIN, EMPIRE'S WORKSHOP: LATIN AMERICA, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE RISE OF

THE NEW IMPERIALISM 123-25 (2006). Americans were under false impressions about the

alleged threats posed by Iraq and expansive occupation costs were not presented. Bejesky,
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Commonly-understood similarities with corporate loans provide an
origin for addressing the core contractual obligation, but distinctions
between corporate and sovereign form, complexity in governance, selfdetermination, interactions with other international law principles, and
diplomatic relations require different jurisprudential perspectives for
sovereign loan contracts. Before considering the basis for and elements
of the test, a second precursor consideration addresses the
circumstances that spotlight ODD discussions.
B. IsolatingPropaganda
Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, well-intentioned voices
proposed relief from Saddam Hussein's debts. Advocates included
Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz, Oxfam, the Heritage Foundation, the
38
Cato Institute, human rights groups, and other organizations and think
tanks. 39 Presumably, relieving Hussein's debt would provide a higher
standard of living to Iraqis and might implant precedent to reduce the
sovereign debt of other disenfranchised developing world populations,4 0
or even address corruption. Instead, applicability was curtailed, likely
due to the advocacy's origin. Professor Adam Feibelman writes that
because "sovereigns generally do not repudiate their obligations," it was
Politico-InternationalLaw, supra, at 56-63; JOSEPH STIGLITZ & LINDA BILMES, Preface to THE
THREE TRILLION DOLLAR WAR, at x (2008). During the Bush Jr. administration, expenditures

and debt mounted. Id. at 53-57. Bush Jr. provided massive tax cuts to the wealthiest tax bracket,
which initiated the growth of the deficit. See Bush-Era Tax Cuts, N.Y. TIMES (updated Feb. 13,
2012), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/t/taxation/bush-taxcuts/in
dex.html. Congressional Republicans attempted this during the Clinton administration, but "they
could not overcome President Clinton's veto." Charles Tiefer, Congress's Transformative
'Republican Revolution' in 2001-2006 and the Future of One-Party Rule, 23 J.L. & POL. 231,
238 (2007). Shortly after Bush entered office in 2001, the first $1.35 trillion tax cut was passed
by one vote in the Senate without any attempt to reconcile, which was similar to what unfolded
during the Reagan administration in 1981. Id. at 249-54. The Reagan and Bush Jr.
Administrations also presided over devastating macroeconomic effects. See generally MARK
JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RS22950, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, FANNIE MAE AND

FREDDIE MAC IN CONSERVATORSHIP (2008), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organiz

ation/1 10097.pdf (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bailout during the Bush Jr. administration);
Sylvester, supra note 10, at 324-25 ($500 billion Savings and Loan bailout during the
Reagan/Bush Sr. administration); E.J. KANE, THE S&L INSURANCE MESS: How DID IT HAPPEN?

(1989) (excessive deregulation was a possible cause).
38. Shafter, supra note 1, at 670; Feibelman, supra note 1, at 729.
39. P6rez & Weissman, supra note 28, at 702; Kevin H. Anderson, InternationalLaw and
State Succession: A Solution to the IraqiDebt Crisis?,2005 UTAH L. REV. 401, 435 (2005).
40. Sarah Ludington & Mitu Gulati, A Convenient Truth: Fact and Fantasy in the
Doctrine of Odious Debts, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 595, 601 (2008); Jonathan E. Sanford, Foreign
Debts to the U.S. Government: Recent Rescheduling and Forgiveness,28 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L
L. & EcoN. 345, 380, 383 (1995) (Debt reduction may reduce poverty, promote human rights,
and potentially improve international relations.).
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a dramatic proposal when "[v]arious commentators . . . affiliated with
the American administration . . . proposed that the new Iraqi regime

should simply disavow obligations incurred by Saddam Hussein."4 1
Specific jurisprudence and applicability was often emphasized,
particularly that which was eloquently formulated by Alexander Sack in
1927.42 Sack wrote:
If a despotic power incurs a debt [not] for the needs or in the
interests of the State, but to strengthen its despotic regime, to
repress the population that fights against it, etc. this debt is
odious for the population of all the State. This debt is not an
obligation for the nation; it is a regime's debt, a personal debt of
the power that has incurred it, consequently it falls with the fall
of this power. The reason these "odious" debts cannot be
considered to encumber the territory of the State, is that such
debts do not fulfill one of the conditions that determine the
legality of the debts of the State, that is: the debts of the State
must be incurred and the funds from it employed for the needs
and in the interests of the State. "Odious" debts, incurred and
used for ends which, to the knowledge of the creditors, are
contrary to the interests of the nation, do not comprise the
latter-in the case that the nation succeeds in getting rid of the
government which incurs them-except to the extent that real
advantages were obtained from these debts. The creditors have
committed a hostile act with regards to the people; they can't
therefore expect that the nation freed from a despotic power
assume the "odious" debts, which are personal debts of that
power. 43
An ODD definition that employs the "highly emotive" and "highly
successful buzzword" of "odious" invokes "clear moral condemna-

41. Feibelman, supra note 1, at 733. Neoconservatives, such as Richard Perle, Paul
Wolfowitz, and White House officials who urged for invasion also initiated proposals to cancel
debt. King, supra note 1, at 606 n.3; Perez & Weissman, supra note 28, at 702; Ludington &
Gulati, supra note 40, at 601; see generally Bejesky, Politico-InternationalLaw, supra note 37;
Sanford, supra note 40, at 353-57 ("The U.S. government has rarely forgiven debts owed to it
by foreign governments or individuals, although it has been willing to adjust the repayment
schedules.").
42. Shafter, supra note 1, at 669.
43. PATRICIA ADAMS, PROBE INT'L, ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION AND
THE THIRD WORLD'S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY 165 (1991) (quoting ALEXANDER N. SACK, LES
EFFETs DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES ETATS SUR LEURS DETTES PUBLIQUES ET AUTRES
OBLIGATIONS FINANCIERES 157 (1927)), http://probeinternational.org/library/wp-content/up
loads/2010/11/Odious-Debts.pdf.
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tion."4 However, Sack's formulation involves several elements. Overemphasis on dictator repression may gravitate from a broader breach of
government/citizenry fiduciary obligations and oratory may distract
attention from the inconvenient controversy. 45 Before the invasion, the
Bush administration consistently maintained that Hussein's government
posed a threat to world peace, possessed WMDs, had ties to al-Qaeda,
and insisted that U.N. inspectors were wrong as they provided nonincriminating biweekly Security Council updates for four months.4 6
Post-invasion investigations disproved allegations,4 7 the vast majority of
the international community condemned the attack, and regularlyconducted polls over several years confirmed that between 75% and
90% of Iraqis opposed continuing occupation. 4 8 With the mission
shifting to "liberation," emphasizing ODD principles both ex postfacto
rhetorically justifies the invasion and highlights a goodwill mission of
benevolent occupation to undo remnants of the former regime.4 9
However, there is an expanse between rhetoric and the practical
application of debt relief.
C. An Unassuming ODD Application
Significantly relieving and restructuring Iraq's economic travail was
a precondition to successful occupation because Iraq's balance of
payments, currency reserves, and debt structure approximated financial
risks of an overly-leveraged, bankrupt-prone corporation.50 Cognizant
of Iraq's debt long before the invasion, the administration appointed
44. Ludington & Gulati, supra note 40, at 639.
45. Adams, supra note 43 (Sack uses "despotic power" but articulates factors such as
lack of populace consent to the debt obligation, credit not providing value to the people, and
creditor knowledge that the lending provides no benefit to the population). These factors can
exist outside of despotic rule.
46. Study: 'FalsePretenses' Led U.S. to War, CBS NEWS, Jan. 23, 2008; Study: Bush,
Aides Made 935 False Statements in Run-Up to War, CNN, Jan. 23, 2008, http://articles.cnn.
com/2008-01-23/politics/bush.iraqIintelligence-flaws-iraq-and-al-qaeda-study? s=PM:POL
ITICS; Robert Bejesky, Weapon Inspections Lessons Learned: Evidentiary Presumptions and
Burdens of Proof 38 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 295 (2011) [hereinafter Bejesky, Weapon
InspectionsLessons Learned].
47. Robert Bejesky, Intelligence Information and Judicial Evidentiary Standards, 44
CREIGHTON L. REv. 811, 811-12 (2011).

48. Bejesky, Politico-InternationalLaw, supra note 37, at 104-05; Bejesky, Weapon
InspectionsLessons Learned,supra note 46, at 342-44.
49. See Bejesky, Weapon Inspections Lessons Learned, supra note 46, at 359. The
message was that the former regime was illegitimate, deposing it was necessary, anything it
touched was condemnable, and Iraqis are better off. Id. at 344.
50. On bankrupt-prone corporations, see generally Carl S. Bjerre, Project Finance,
Securitization and Consensuality, 12 DUKE J. COM. & INT'L L. 412, 413 (2002); infra Parts
III.B-C.
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government officials and Iraqi exiles to a Future of Iraq project that
developed open market reform agendas and postulated ramifications
from existing debt.5 ' Pre-invasion estimates placed aggregate
indebtedness at between $62 and $361 billion, with higher ap raisals
apt to consume 75% of government spending for debt service. 2 postinvasion assessments placed the total at $120 billion.5 3
Vastly deviating estimates were primarily due to the uncertain
amount owed to Kuwait. The Security Council established a subsidiary
organ to determine "direct losses, damages, and injuries caused by
Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait" and structured a tribunal with
inquisitorial investigative standards. 54 Damage claims were tendered,
but Iraq had marginal ability to refute plaintiffs that frequently lacked
records aid evidence.55 The tribunal established tort-like categories
according to gravity of injury/damage and individuals and entities filed
2.68 million claims, seeking more than $350 billion in compensation. 56
From 1985 to 1990, Kuwait's annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
averaged $41.3 billion,5 7 but claims exceeded eight times the country's
entire annual production. The level of damage is astounding because
one year after Iraq's military was expelled, Kuwait's GDP rose to
$37.57 billion in 1992, and to a record high of $51.4 billion in 1993.58
As for settling the outstanding balance, in 2007, Kuwait contended that
$199 billion was still owed, 9 but recent negotiations and payments
51. Robert Bejesky, Geopolitics, Oil Law Reform, and Commodity Market Expectations,
63 OKLA. L. REV. 193, 215-19 (2011) [hereinafter Bejesky, Geopolitics]; see also Bejesky,
Politico-InternationalLaw, supra note 37, at 75-81; John C. Yoo & Will Tracbman, War,
InternationalLaw, and Sovereignty: Reevaluating the Rules of the Game in a New Century Less than Bargainingfor: The Use of Forceand the Declining Relevance of the United Nations,
5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 379, 386 (2005) (suggesting that debt repayment was so important that
permanent Security Council members, such as France and Russia, might have wanted to avoid
war so that Iraq would be able to repay debt owed to them).
52. Steven M. Kosiak, Potential Costs of a War with Iraq and Its Post War Occupation,
2003 CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS, http://www.docstoc.com/docs/
21205688/.
53. MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21765, IRAQ: DEBT RELIEF (2005).
54. John J. Chung, The United Nations Compensation Commission and the Balancing of
Rights Between Individual Claimants and the Government of Iraq, 10 UCLA J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 141, 145 (2005).
55. Id. at 153-55, 162-63. Moreover, Hussein's teetering and intemationally-ostracized
regime would seem uninterested in the state's future financial accounts or in responding to
abuse accusations.
56. See id. at 147-50; Anderson, supra note 39, at 433.
57. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database (Apr. 2008),
availableat http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/weodata/weoselgr.aspx (calculating GDP by using "Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) valuation
of country GDP" totals to $248.036 billion over the six-year period).
58. See id.
59. Steven Mufson & Robin Wright, In a Major Step, Saudi Arabia Agrees to Write off
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purportedly reduced the remaining balance to $28 billion. 60
How debt aggregated also contributed to the uncertain total and
normative disagreements over how much should be imposed on a future
Iraq. U.N. sanctions froze Iraq out of the world economy for over a
decade, 6 1 which reduced means of generating revenues to repay
creditors.6 2 Oil exports were restricted, but were eventually
commissioned by the U.N. Oil for Food Program that directed revenues
toward humanitarian expenditures, the inspection process, and war
reparations.6 3 If Hussein's rule held the people captive and required
economic sanctions for containment, it may be unreasonable to assume
citizens should be expected to repay aggregating debt that was partially
due to that quarantine.
Shortly after the invasion, the Bush Administration offered proposals
to reduce Iraq's debt 64 and issued a joint statement: "France, Germany,
and the United States agree that there should be substantial debt
reduction for Iraq in the Paris Club in 2004, and will work closel with
each other and with other countries to achieve this objective." ' The
Paris Club, which is not an institution but a creditor country collective
action forum,66 has a close association with the IMF and World Bank
and an ideological affinity for restructuring debtor country economies
with neoliberal principles. 67 The Club was founded on and favored debt
80 Percent ofIraqiDebt, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2007.

60. See Iraq 'SteppingBack from Abyss,' BBC NEWS (May 29, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/middle east/7424782.stm. By 2003, Iraq had paid $46.6 billion to over 1.5 million
claimants. Tara Weinstein, ProsecutingAttacks that Destroy the Environment: Environmental
Crimes or HumanitarianAtrocities?, 17 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 697, 712 (2005).
61. Kristen Boon, Coining a New Jurisdiction: The Security Council as Economic
Peacekeeper,41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 991, 1001-02 (2008).

62. See id at 1001. Most of Hussein's debts traced back two decades. Security Council
sanctions on Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Iran, North Korea, and Sudan are examples of using
diplomacy and sanctions to freeze regimes out of credit markets, which approximate an ex ante
ODD.
63. Bejesky, Geopolitics, supra note 51, at 217. Iraq is still paying 5% of oil revenue to
Kuwait pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1483. MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL34064, IRAQ: OIL AND GAS LEGISLATION, REVENUE SHARING, AND U.S. POLICY 16

(2009), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/44019.pdf.
64. Esther Pan, Iraq: The Regime's Debt, FOREIGN AFF. (Dec. 31, 2003), available at
http://www.cfr.org/publication/7796.
65. Press Release White House, Official Language of the Joint Statement (Dec. 16,
2003), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031216-11 .html.
The White House maintained a position of supporting "Iraq to reach a final and comprehensive
decision regarding the [unresolved] demands of compensation that Iraq inherited from the
former regime" and of protecting Iraqi assets from creditor demands. John R. Crook,
ContemporaryPracticeof the United States, 103 AM. J. INT'L L. 135, 135 (2009), availableat
http://www.jstor.org/pss/20456730.
66. Anderson, supra note 39, at 414.
67. See id.
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repayment rather than "fresh starts" and applied that view to provide
political leverage to reschedule hundreds of loans since the mid1970s.6 8

Within a year, Paris Club members forgave 80%69 of the nearly $40
billion that they were owed, 7 0 which was approximately one-fourth of
the estimated aggregate debt (excluding the $200 billion Kuwait thenalleged it was owed). 7 ' Over fifty countries relinquished debt claimsSaudi Arabia agreed to forgive 80% of $15 billion owed,72 Russia most
of $12.9 billion, 73 the United Arab Emirates $7 billion, 74 and the US $4
billion. Debt relief was dubbed "backdoor bankruptcy,"7 6 while the
remainder was rescheduled 7 7 without lenders having to prove loan
legitimacy.7 8 The $20 billion owed to commercial creditors was
restructured as new debt 79 in a 2005 program that required claimants to
68. Id.; see also Agasha Mugasha, Solutions for Developing-Country External Debt:
Insolvency or Forgiveness, 13 LAW & Bus. REV. AM. 859, 860 (2007); Sanford, supra note 40,
at 358.
69. Geir Moulson, U.S., Germany Agree on Iraqi Debt Write-Off, WASH. POST, Nov. 21,
2004, at A28; Craig S. Smith, Major Creditors Agree to Cancel 80% of Iraq Debt, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 22, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/22/intemational/middleeast/22debt.html.
70.

MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IRAQ: PARIS CLUB DEBT RELIEF,

http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/44019.pdf (last updated Jan. 19, 2005). Specifically,
the debt consists of $21 billion in principal and $19 billion in interest. Id. For further
information regarding the issue of Iraq's debt forgiveness, see Pan, supra note 64; Paul Blustein,
Debt ReliefPlan Eludes IMF Group, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2004, at A28.
71. Volinka Reina, Iraq's Delictual and Contractual Liabilities: Would Politics or
International Law Provide for Better Resolution of Successor State Responsibility?, 22
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 583, 609-10 (2004); Alan B. Krueger, Economic Scene; What will be the
Model for Peace in Postwar Iraq-GermanyAfter World War I or After World War H?, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 3, 2003), http://articles.nytimes.com/2003/04/03/business/economic-scene-whatwill-be-model-for-peace-postwar-iraq-germany-after-world-war.html.
72. Mufson & Wright, supra note 59.
73. Andrew E. Kramer, Russia Forgives Iraq Billions in Debt, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/12/world/europe/12moscow.html.
74. UAE to Cancel Iraq's $7 Billion Debt, CNN (July 6, 2008), http://articles.cnn.com/
2008-07-06/world/iraq.uae-l_al-maliki-abdullah-bin-zayed-al-nahyan-iraqi-debt?_s=PM:WOR
LD.
75. U.S. Cancel's Iraq's $4.1 Billion Debt, CNN (Dec. 17, 2004), http://www.cnn.com/
2004/WORLD/meast/12/17/iraq.main/.
76. Feibelman, supra note 1, at 736.
77. See Gelpern, supra note 1, at 406; Ochoa, supra note 1, at 119.
78. See Ochoa, supra note 1, at 119-20. Professor Adams argued that Iraq should have
rejected U.S. debt restructuring proposals and required lenders to prove loan legitimacy under
ODD principles. Id. Human rights groups favored scrutinizing Hussein's debts via an ad hoc
tribunal approach, such as the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal established in 1981 that resolved
disputes arising from reciprocal freezing of assets following the Iranian Revolution. Feibelman,
supra note 1, at 743.
79. See Joanna Chung, Iraq 's Debt Solution Ruffles Feathers, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2005,
at 37; Andrew Balls & Joanna Chung, Critical Phase in Debt Restructuring Completed, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 24-25, 2005, at 5.
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present and abandon claims in exchange for the new Iraqi government's
issuance of market-tradable bonds with a 2028 maturity date.80 Paris
Club members were exceptionally successful at relieving sovereign-held
loans without scrutinizing Hussein's use of funds, while shifting losses
to creditor country taxpayers for value extended by their own previous
governments. 1 Loans were not severed into legitimate versus
illegitimate use as Alexander Sack's formulation recommended.8 2 If
Sack's elements had been applied, it would mean that the Iraqi citizenry
received no value from debts incurred by Hussein's regime from
sovereip-issued credit but did receive value from commercially-issued
loans.'
Perhaps commercial debt was favored over sovereign-held debt due
to the precedent of favoring private over public interest and because
"the elimination of Iraq's debt would enhance Iraqi resources for the
benefit of U.S. interests." 84 Alleviated debt reduces default risk on
newly-incurred debt, much of it deriving from value extended by U.S.
creditors and commercial interests that were providing construction
pursuant to no-bid procurement contracts which were the subject of
several congressional investigations.8 5 The new financial structure may
have even leveraged the foreign pressure for Iraq to adopt a new oil
law.86 While that much-touted oil bill was rejected by the parliament in
80. Carolyn Cohn, Update I - Iraq settles $1.2 bin in Saddam-era Commercial Debt,
REUTERS (Sept. 10, 2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/idNLA482270200809 10?rpc=61 1.
81. See A. Mechele Dickerson, Insolvency Principlesand the Odious Debt Doctrine: The
Missing Link in the Debate, 70 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 53, 78 (2007). It is "simply
inconceivable that [foreign governments] did not know ... that the proceeds" would be used for
corrupt purposes or to perpetrate human rights abuses. Id. Relinquished government issued loans
are ultimately a loss to the creditor country tax base, while alleviated private loans are a
business loss in proportion to percentages that cannot be recouped by being written down
(which is a percentage that taxpayers may ultimately fund). Editorial, Europe at the Brink, N.Y.
TIMES (July 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/20/opinion/20wedl.html; Gabriele
Steinhauser, EU Official: Greece Needs Extra $20 Billion, Assoc. PRESS (Feb. 2, 2012),
http://www.statejournal.com/story/16660388/eu-official-greece-needs-extra-20-billion. Alberto
Gonzalo Santos, Beyond Baker and Brady: Deeper Debt Reduction for Latin American
Sovereign Debtors, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 66, 83-84 (1991). If loans are allocated to controversial
regimes, creditor states must be more conscientious. In comparison to Iraq, private debt across
the developing world has been a much higher percentage of total debt service. See infra Parts
1Il.B-C.
are contrary to the
82. See ADAMS, supra note 43 (stating that "'Odious debts' ...
interests of the nation . . . except to the extent that real advantages were obtained from these
debts.").

83.

See id.

84. Pdrez & Weissman, supra note 28, at 702. U.S. banks could lose from debt alleviation
rules. See Thomas Oatley & Jason Yackee, American Interests and IMF Lending, 41 INT'L POL.
415 (2004), availableat http://www.unc.edu/-toatley/IMF.pdf.
85. Bejesky, Geopolitics, supra note 51, at 212-14, 249, 269-71.
86. The U.S. Congress made a new oil law a "benchmark" for progress and the IMF
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2008 and 2009, the national and sub-national "cash-strapped" Iraqi
governments still consummated controversial, and possibly unconstitutional, long-term Production Sharing Agreements with multinational oil
companies.

III. IDENTIFYING ODIOUS

DEBT

A. ODD Circumstances CoagulatedForty Years Ago
Without viable lessons or relevant precedent from Iraq's high-profile
circumstance, there was no application to equitably alleviate debt that
amassed on other developing countries under past ODD circumstances.
Congo, Ethiopia, South Africa, Haiti, the Philippines, Indonesia,
Rwanda, Nigeria,89 and many Latin American countries90 might have
been more suitable candidates for ODD debt forgiveness than Iraq. For
most impacted countries, the foremost question is continuity of debt
obligations that derived from questionable distant lending.9' Numerous
countries tacitly assumed and repaid dictator debts that might have been
challengeable, which relatively decreased standard of living and
development opportunities by removing economic value from the local
economy.93
included it as a precondition for new loans. Id. at 240-42.
87. Id. at 249-50. This outcome also involved extinguishing "old" commercial obligations with "new" ones. See Dickerson, supra note 81, at 72-73. Preexisting oil development
contracts with companies from France, Russia, China, India, Spain, and Indonesia were
suspended. Bejesky, Geopolitics, supra note 51, at 220-22. Susan Sachs, Hussein's Regime
Skimmed Billions from Aid Programs, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 29, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/
2004/02/29/world/hussein-s-regime-skimmed-billions-from-aid-program.html. Satisfactory fulfillment of executory contracts would seem inconsequential to relations with the ousted regime,
but one poll indicated that 62% of Americans believed that Iraq contracts with foreign
companies should not be honored because they were made with the displaced government.
Fabrizio McLaughlin & Assoc., Americans Say Contracts with Saddam are Null and Void, Apr.
15, 2003.
88. Anderson, supra note 39, at 438-39 (referencing Joseph Stiglitz); see also Dawit
Kiros Fantaye, Fighting Corruptionand Embezzlement in Third World Countries,68 J.CRIM. L.
170 (2004).
89. Dickerson, supra note 81, at 64.
90. See infra Parts III.C, IV.C.
91. See infra Parts III.B-D (interest on principal amasses to distend the obligation).
92. King, supra note 1, at 616.
93.

See DAMIEN MILLET & ERic TOuSSAINT, WHO OWES WHO? 50 QUESTIONS ABOUT

WORLD DEBT 121-22 (Vicki Briault Manus trans., 2004). A recent estimate is that for every $1
outstanding in 1980, developing countries still owed $4 and had already paid $7.50. Loans
provide a present value from the initial allocation, but future utility decreases to service the loan.
Andrew K. Rose & Mark M. Spiegel, A Gravity Model of Sovereign Lending: Trade, Default,
and Credit 52-53 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Staff Papers vol. 50, (2004)), http://www.imf.org/
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ODD inquiries are transnational 94 and converge with unsustainable
debt questions. 95 For example, if loans were accepted, but potentiallyodious debt went unchallenged due to presumptions that debt continues
as a sovereign obligation even while the populace might have had no
reasonable means to object. The original dubious obligation under
international law can mount from interest rates, adverse currency
fluctuations, global macroeconomic conditions, and other variables
beyond the control of a debt-stricken country. 96 Century-old ODD
formulations preceded transnational effects of mounting accounts,
market-value exchange rates, and international institutions that
solidified rules for efficient and continuous credit markets. Moreover,
high debt loads may function as an external influence that furthers
imprudent fiscal decisions or leverages creditor country authority to
make impositions that bypass populace will, rational choice, and selfdetermination of the debtor country. 97
The remainder of this Article explores how and why an ODD should
be viewed as a contract defense based upon the interaction between
potential unsavory sovereign agents and mounting debt; how international law supports severing mounting odious debt from the assumption
of continuing state obligations; and how courts could address a debt
case that contains appropriate facts. Generalities are employed to
substantiate an analytical framework that incorporates private law and
international law and jurisprudence, but application of this framework is
factually complex for any given country.
external/pubs/ft/staffp/2003/00-00/rs.pdf. Debt can be paid by exporting more value than is
imported, increasing taxes, or implementing other competition policies. Challengeable defects in
original loan obligations may open questions of whether a population should receive credit for
paying on obligations that should have been deemed odious.
94. See Lienau, supra note 1, at 63. Domestic loan disputes can be resolved internally. Id
at 97-98. Accumulating external obligations relies on state sovereignty and its treatment of the
state as an actor with perpetual existence. Id. Sovereign continuity provided governments with
fairly easy access to capital and credit. Id. Conflict between domestic-level popular sentiment,
good governance, self-determination, and international comity norms to maintain financial
accounts, creates the ODD issue.
95. Jeffrey Sachs, The Development Challenge, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 84-87 (2005),
http://www.earth.columbia.edulsitefiles/file/about/ director/documents/foreignaff0305.pdf.
96. Government officials control fiscal accounts, incur debt, and forecast debt repayment
serviceability, but international credits and debts are maintained as current account, balance of
payment, and capital account entries. Nouriel Roubini & David Backus, Lectures in
Macroeconomics: Chapter 3. International Indicators, http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/-nroubinil
NOTES/CHAP3.htm. Transnational effects from currency cooperation are profound. See infra
Part II.B; Michael G. Papaioannou, Exchange Rate Risk Measurementand Management: Issues
and Approaches for Firms, 2 S.E. EuR. J. EcoN. 129, 129-30 (2006), http://www.asecu.
gr/Seeje/issue07/papaioannou.pdf (Exchange rate fluctuation raises consternation for private
firms.).
97. See generally infra Parts III.C-E, IV.
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B. From Fixed to FloatingExchange Rates and "Loan Pushing"
The 1944 Bretton Woods agreement initiated modem-day economic
cooperation, solidified rules for continuity of sovereign financial
accounts, and established a fixed exchange rate system with countries
either directly pegging currencies to the U.S. dollar or setting value by
relying upon a collateralized guarantee that the valuable physical asset
of gold could be called upon for purchase and sale on demand.98 In
1971, claiming that Vietnam War expenditures were bankrupting the
United States, President Nixon failed to convert dollars into gold 9 and
disrupted the original IMF agreement.' 00 The Gold Standard was
formally abandoned and gradually superseded by a system in which
governments exercised fewer regulatory controls over currency
exchan e and more freely permitted supply and demand to set exchange
value.
Critics contend that permitting currencies to "float" based on
accounting numbers was a destructive act that brought instability and
ushered in "finance capitalism," which has been called "making money
by manipulating money."'102 Alternatively, the Gold Standard might
necessarily have had to be abandoned with increasing economic
complexity.103 Also, even without a tangible asset backing, financial
accounts were still stabilizing protections, such as diplomatic trust
among sovereigns and IMF membership standards. 0 For lenders,
efficient markets, transnational loan pricing, and default risk could
presumably be established by examining a county's balance of
payments, currency reserves, economic conditions, and repayment

98. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat.
1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 [hereinafter IMF Articles]. Article IV of the original IMF Agreement
required setting "Par Value of Currencies" with the price of gold or at a parity rate with the U.S.
dollar. Id art. 4. See also CHALMERS JOHNSON, BLOWBACK 200-01 (2000) [hereinafter JOHNSON,
BLOWBACK].

99. CHALMERS JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE 264-65 (Henry Holt 2005) (2004)
[hereinafter JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE].
100. See Allan H. Meltzer, Report of the International Financial Institution Advisory
Commission (IFIAC), 2000 INT'L FIN. INST. ADVISORY COMM'N [hereinafter IFIAC],
http://www.house.gov/jec/imf/meltzer.pdf.
101. David Harvey, Politicaland Economic Dimensions of Free Trade: Neoliberalism as
Creative Destruction,610 ANNALS 22, 27 (2007); see generally infra Part III.C.
102.

JOHNSON, BLOWBACK, supra note 98, at 201 (referencing novelist John Ralston Saul);

John Ralston Saul, Paper Games and Monetary Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1992.
103. Josh Boak, Newt Gingrich's Gold StandardStance Mission Endorsements, POLITICO
(Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0112/71748.html ("[Tihe United States
abandoned the gold standard in 1971, moving to a flat currency that made it easier to address
financial crises through the money supply but risked inflation.").
104. See generally infra Parts II.E, I.C.
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record. 0 5
The demise of the Gold Standard system coincided with increased
lending to developing countries. Developing world debt increased from
$25 billion (1970), 6 to $130 billion (1973), and to $474 billion
(1980).107 Debt crises followed,'os particularly for countries that
borrowed at floating interest rates that skyrocketedl 09 and required
refinancing and payment rescheduling. 0 A World Bank economist
explained that "rescheduling has not eased the debt burden" because it
merely "takes debt that is not being serviced and makes a new loan out
of it at higher interest rates."' For the thirteen largest U.S. banks,
earning percentages from foreign sources increased from less than 19%
(1970) to 50% (1976).112 American banks received as much as 80% of
their revenue from developing world governments,' 1 many of which
were governed by corrupt and nondemocratic regimes that siphoned off
portions of loan proceeds.1 4 Explanations for overlending emphasized
imprudent borrowing, global structural and economic conditions, U.S.
government Policies, and multinational bank "loan pushing" for
Other than imprudent borrowing, all other causes were
profitability.'
105. Yener Altunba§ & Blaise Gadanecz, Developing Country Economic Structure and the
Pricing of Syndicated Credits 3, 11-12, 17 (Bank Int'l Devs., Working Paper No. 132, 2003),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/workl32.pdf; see generally Sebastian Edwards, LDC's
Foreign Borrowing and Default Risk: An EmpiricalInvestigation 1976-1980, 74 AMER. ECON.
REv. 726 (1984).
106. Ordu, supra note 7, at 237.
107.

GRANDIN, supra note 37, at 183.

108. Anderson, supra note 39, at 413, 431; Priya Alagiri, Give Us Sovereignty or Give Us
Debt: Debtor Countries' Perspective on Debt-for Nature Swaps, 41 AM. U.L. REv. 485, 486
(1992); JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE, supra note 99, at 266; Ben S. Bemanke, Chairman,

Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Economic
Summit: Inflation in Latin America: A New Era? (Feb. 11, 2005), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/20050211/default.htm; Paul Krugman,
A Model of Balance ofPayments Crises, 11 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 311 (1979).
109. Anderson, supra note 39, at 412; see also Sylvester, supra note 10, at 264.
110. See, e.g., WALDEN BELLO, DILEMMAS OF DOMINATION 109 (2005); ALDE, supra note
7, at 101.
111. Sylvester, supra note 10, at 266.
112. GRANDIN, supra note 37, at 183.
113.

JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE, supra note 99, at 266 (referencing Citicorp and

Bankers Trust).
114.

NICHOLAS GUYATr, ANOTHER AMERICAN CENTURY? THE UNITED STATES AND THE

WORLD AFTER 2000, at 8 (Zed Books Ltd. 2003) (2000); Anderson, supra note 39, at 413 (banks
profited as dictators accumulated debts in at least twenty countries).
115. Mugasha, supra note 68, at 861; Alessandro Penati & Aris Protopapadakis, The Effect
of Implicit Deposit Insurance on Banks Portfolio Choices with an Application to International
'Overexposure' 1 (Rodney L. White Ctr. For Fin. Res. Working Paper No. 19-86, 1986),
available at http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~rlwctr/papers/8619.PDF (possible explanations
for multinational "overexposure" with LDC loans include "bad luck," "market failures,"
"suboptimal use of information," and "profit maximizing" behavior); Santos, supra note 81, at
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arguably beyond debtor country control."16
The OPEC standoff during the earl-1970s modified the oil supply
system and influenced the debt crisis because higher energy prices
brought cost-of-living and government budgetary increases, while
transferring more wealth to oil-rich country interests.' The global oil
distribution system was largely controlled by the Seven Sister (Britishand U.S.-multinational) oligopoly,"l 9 and much of the oil-rich country
wealth remained in New York, London, and Japanese banks that
became engorged with these "petrodollar deposits" 20 that "needed to
earn high returns." 121 This process has been formally labeled "recycling
petrodollars" 22 and the funds were a readily-available source of capital
for international lending.12 3
As for the impact on the U.S. economy, either as a result of energy
price increases or from other causes, U.S. inflation rates remained
predominantly in single digits from the mid-1960s until the late1980s.124 However, when developing world monetary policy sought to
71-72 (causes include (1) global economic circumstances, (2) commercial bank liberal lending,
and (3) debtor country policies); John T. Cuddington, The Extent and Causes of the Debt Crisis
of the 1980s, in DEALING WITH THE DEBT CRISIS 17 (Ishrat Husain & Ishac Diwani eds., 1989)

("[I]mprudent borrowing is usually impossible without imprudent lending").
116. Ismael Hossein-Zadeh, The Crisis of Third World Debt-Is There a Way Out?, 1991
PROC.

OF

THE

15TH

ANNIVERSARY

THIRD

WORLD

CONF.

FOUND.

27,

available at

http://www.politicaleconomics.info/papers/ThirdWorldDebt.htm (listing oil shocks, OECD
actions to stimulate demand, lending institutions, and policies of the debtor countries as prime
causes, and noting that "[o]nly a small portion of the massive Third World debt has actually
been received (and spent in) these countries"); see generally supra note 115; infra note 117-38.
117. Bejesky, Geopolitics, supra note 51, at 273; GRANDIN, supra note 37, at 178-79.
118. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., The LDC Debt Crisis [hereinafter FDIC], in AN
EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980S AND EARLY 1990s, 191, 192-93 (1999),

available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/ historical/history/191 210.pdf ; see also Alagiri, supra
note 108, at 486 n.2.
119. Bejesky, Geopolitics, supra note 51, at 210-13. The 1973 oil embargo exacerbated
recessionary conditions. Harvey, supra note 101, at 27.
120. Santos, supra note 81, at 73; Sylvester, supra note 10, at 263-64.
121. Andreas Lowenfeld, PoliticalEconomy for the 1980's: Global Banks and National
Governments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1061, 1069 (1988); W. Max Corden, The World Credit Crisis:
UnderstandingIt, and What To Do 3-4 (Melb. Inst. Working Paper Series No. 25/08, 2008)
(stating that even today, credit from surplus savings rates, particularly in Japan, some European
countries, and China, has been called an "international savings glut" because excess funds are
looking for high interest rate returns).
122.

Matthew Higgins et al., Recycling Petrodollars,12 CURRENT ISSUES IN EcoN. & FIN.

1-2 (2006), availableat http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/currentissues/cil2-9.pdf; DAVID
E. SPIRO, THE HIDDEN

HAND OF AMERICAN

HEGEMONY: PETRODOLLAR

RECYCLING AND

INTERNATIONAL MARKETS (1999).

123. Higgins et al., supra note 122.
124. See William G. Dewald, Historical U.S. Money Growth, Inflation, and Inflation
Credibility, FED. RES. BANK ST. LouIs REV. 13, 13 (1998) (determining that U.S. inflation rates

were 1%(1964), 6% (1973), 11% (1974), 9% (1975), 6-8% (1976-78), and 11-14% (1979-81)).
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react to evolving economic conditions and crises, some countries faced
double and triple digit annual inflation rates.125 With the U.S. dollar as
the dominant currency from which to measure exchange rates' 2 6 and the
U.S. Federal Reserve's ability to make monetary decisions for the U.S.
economy, including expanding the money supply,127 U.S. monetary
policy might be incorporated into and influence international financial
transactionsl 28 while being immune from systemic-based shocks that
have more serious repercussions on other countries.
From the creditor side, while the overlending "bank behavior
appears ... surprising since claims on sovereign borrowers by and large
are unenforceable,"' international law does affirm continuity of state
financial obligations 30 and a sovereign nation "does not go
bankrupt."' 3 ' Explanations for multinational bank risk-assumption
included that asymmetric information about borrowing countries
accounts abetted overlending;1 32 bank management sometimes failed to
supervise the firm's risk takers, which is the corporate principallagent
problem;133 multinational "lending banks had been imprudent,"
"predatory," and exercising "extraordinarily poor collective judgment;"
and "the regulators had been almost criminally lax and complacent." 134
125. See Bemanke, supra note 108. "A measure of price changes in nine of the most
populous Latin American countries shows that inflation in the region averaged nearly 160
percent per year in the 1980s and 235 percent per year in the first half of the 1990s." Id
Monetary policy is maintained with IMF transparency standards and currency value is measured
against dominant currency values. See id
126. C. Fred Bergsten, The Dollar and the Deficits: How Washington can Prevent the Next
Crisis, 88 FOREIGN AFF. (2009), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.corm/articles/65446/cfred-bergsten/the-dollar-and-the-deficits; Katie Hunt, Will the US Dollar Remain King?, BBC
NEWS (Mar. 26, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7965518.stm.
127. Corden, supra note 121, at 11.
128. Sylvester, supra note 10, at 264.
129. Penati & Protopapadakis, supra note 115, at 1. The contract right is derivatively a
property right by application, as determined by the sovereign law of the situs of the property.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§§

209(l)(a)-(c) (1987)

[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. Creditors cannot reach the sovereign's assets without
cooperation (unless assets are attached in foreign countries). Feibelman, supra note 1, at 729;
Mugasha, supra note 68, at 869-70 (citing several cases of successful creditor enforcement in
the United States and England).
130. See infra Part III.A.
131. Sylvester, supra note 10, at 304 (comment by Citibank Chairman Walter Wriston);
see also infra notes 275-76.
132. See Kenneth Kletzer, Asymmetries of Information and LDC Borrowing with
Sovereign Risk, 94 ECON. J. 287 (1984).
133. Corden, supra note 121, at 6.
134. Sylvester, supra note 10, at 262, 290; Thomas S. Wyler, Swiping the Slate:
Maintaining CapitalMarkets While Addressing the Odious Debt Dilemma, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L L.
947, 980 (2008) (stating that it is important to prevent creditors from avoiding responsibility by
remaining ignorant on how funds are spent). An insightful approach of instilling private sector
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The Economist blamed banks collectively: "For many years they lent on
risks that were known to be bad, and did so merely because their
competitors did so, because they did not want to be left out of the
crowd."13 5
U.S. government policies may have fostered bank overlending and
reduced objective assessments of economic conditions. In 1983, the
House Banking Committee determined: "In the last decade the U.S.
government, along with other western governments, encouraged bank
overseas lending on the theory that the private flow of funds would aid
In addition to tax deductions that might
U.S. export and job markets."
be available for bad debts, the U.S. FDIC provided lenders with
protection from developing country loan losses by implicit deposit
insurance.' 37 If banks lend based on insured deposits, risk of debtor
default might not be set by market conditions.1 38 Perceived risk could be
responsibility is to require banks to collectively assess regime legitimacy, mutually-promise not
to lend odious debt money, only lend "pursuant to the sovereign's representation about the
legitimate use of funds," stipulate to jurisdiction to enforce promises, and ensure that borrowing
governments bring subsequent creditors into the system on pre-existing terms (to provide
constructive notice on odious debt). Feibelman, supra note 1, at 727-29, 748-49, 755, 761, 765.
Consortium-managed checks should prevent oligopolistic effects and competition-undermining
antitrust environments that could ostracize certain creditors or influence a country's fiscal
policy, particularly when a country's public debt is a high percentage of government spending.
135. Sylvester, supra note 10, at 288 (quoting Bottomless Debt, EcONoMIsT, Dec. 11,
1982, at 12); Shafter, supra note 1, at 695 (stating that there is a need to recognize multilateral
dimensions of lending to undesirable regimes); see generally PETER DOMBROWSKI, POLICY
RESPONSES TO THE GLOBALIZATION OF AMERICAN BANKING (1996).

136. International Bank Lending: Hearings Before the Sub-Committee on Fin. Inst.
Supervision, Regulation & Ins. of the House Comm. on Banking, Fin. & Urban Affairs, 98th
Cong. 1st Sess. (1983) (statement of C.T. Conover, Comptroller of the Currency).
137. See John H. Kareken & Neil Wallace, Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation: A
Partial Equilibrium Exposition, 51 J. Bus. 413 (1978); Allesandro Penati & Aris
Protopapadakis, The Effect of Implicit Deposit Insurance on Banks' Portfolio Choices with an
Application to International "Overexposure," 21 J. MONETARY ECON. 107 (1988); see also
Penati & Protopapadakis, supra note 115, at 1-2, 28-29.
FDIC insurance as implemented currently has two components. One is that
bank deposits that meet certain requirements are insured explicitly by the FDIC
at a fixed insurance premium that is independent of the nature of the insured
risk. The second component is related to long-standing FDIC practices that
frequently end up protecting contractually uninsured depositors.
Id.; Douglas W. Diamong & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, DepositInsurance, andLiquidity, 91
J. POL. EcoN. 401 (1983).

138. See Shafter, supra note 1, at 692. A modem day perspective that might instill creditor
government responsibility over private lending to odious regimes could include overseeing
private lending to sovereigns, labeling regimes, constituting an agency to provide ex ante
guidance about regimes, suggesting high-risk to low-risk designations, or even advising on
lending. See id. For the United States, initiatives would progress beyond due diligence standards
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reduced by taxpayer-funded U.S. government promises to repay upon
default.
Multinational banks earned substantial profits in early years, but
default risk increased as debt mounted.' 9 Congressional hearings
recognized the unfolding problem in 1975 and a Senate Subcommittee
on Foreign Relations report in 1977 explained that "[t]he most
immediate worry is that the stability of the U.S. banking system and by
extension the international financial system may be jeopardized by the
massive balance of payment lending that has been done by commercial
banks since the oil price hike."' 4 A Wall Street Journal article in
January 1981 announced, "there's a new mountain on the planet - a
towering $500 billion of debt run up by the developing countries, nearly
all of it within a decade."'41
C. 1980s Loan Pushing andPrivatization
1. Mounting State Obligations
Financial problems during the 1980s derived from overlending
during the 1970s.142 In 1970, developing world debt stood at $25
billion,143 but it grew fortyfold to one trillion by the end of the 1980s.144
For Latin America, between 1980 and 1982, interest payments on loans
increased by over 50%145 and debt-service ratios of Latin American
countries averaged more than 30% of export earnings.146 Latin
American export revenues were offset on current accounts by servicing
incorporated into the Lending Supervision Act of 1983. International Lending Supervision Act
of 1983, 12 U.S.C. § 3901-3912 (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 211.44 (2006).
139. Mark Hulbert, The Causes and Risks of Excessive Foreign Lending, in Policy
Analysis (Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 23, 1983), http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/
pa023.html ("[T]he banks' profits from Third World lending are windfall profits, to the extent
that public resources have been committed to assure that the banks' loans do not go sour. The
banks have not internalized all the risks of lending to the Third World yet continue to earn all
the profits from their loans.").
140. FDIC, supra note 118, at 198 (quoting STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
95TH CONG. REP. ON INT'L DEBT, THE BANKS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 5 (1st Sess. 1977)).

141. Id. at 199-200 (citing Richard F. Janssen, Nations in Hock, Third World's Debts,
totaling $500 Billion, May Pose Big Dangers,WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 1981, at 25-28).
142. See, e.g., Daniel K. Tarullo, The Role of the IMF in Sovereign Debt Restructuring,6
CHI. J. INT'L L. 287, 291 (2005); Robert Kenneth MacCallum, Sovereign Debt Restructuring:
The Rights and Dutiesof Commercial Banks Inter Sese, 1987 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 425, 426.
143. Ordu, supra note 7, at 237.
144. Alfred J. Puchala, Jr., Securitizing Third World Debt, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 137,
137; MacCallum, supra note 142, at 426-27; Sylvester, supra note 10, at 258.
145. GRANDIN, supra note 37, at 183. "$37 billion was owed to the eight largest U.S.
banks and constituted approximately 147 percent of their capital reserves at the time." FDIC,
supra note 118, at 191.
146. FDIC, supra note 118, at 199 (noting that Brazil's debt-service ratio was near 60%).
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external debt that grew from $75 billion (1975) to $314 billion
(1983).147 In 1970, the African continent held only $11 billion in
external debt, but by the mid-1990s, this rose to $340 billion.148 Most
governments were spending more on debt interest than their total
spending on healthcare and education. 149
An unsurprising trend of defaults began in the early-1980s. In the
summer of 1982, Mexico failed to make quarterly payments on $100
billion in debt. 5 o By late-1983, 27 countries owing $239 billion had
already rescheduled, or were attempting to reschedule, debts owed to
commercial banks.15 1 Many countries refinanced over ten times with
longer repayment periods. 2 Fourteen Latin American countries and
other countries in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe followed into de
facto insolvency during the 1980s.153 These problems led the IMF and
World Bank to create the "Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative" in
1996, which is a program that has since identified over forty countries
as carrying "unsustainable debt."' 54 Consequently, while many
countries have since had portions or even all of their multilateral debts
canceled, 5 5 that may not always wipe the slate clean. 5 6

147. ALDE, supra note 7, at 101 (debt service was approximately 50% of the region's
GDP).
148. Ordu, supra note 7, at 231 (sub-Saharan Africa's debt was $250 billion).
149. BELLO, supra note 110, at 135; see also Sanford,supra note 40, at 382 n.238.
150. BELLO, supra note 110, at 109.
151. FDIC, supra note 118, at 191; see also Charles F. Meissner, Crisis as an Opportunity
for Change: A Comment on the Debt Restructuring Process, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 613,
627, 631 (1985).
152. Philip J. Power, Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the Secondary Market and Its
Implicationsfor Future Restructurings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2701, 2713 n.62 (1996).
153. Santos, supra note 81, at 66-67; Ordu, supra note 7, at 255-56; Mugasha, supra note
68, at 859-60; Sylvester, supra note 10, at 304 ("[M]ost debtor nations of sub-Saharan Africa
have, indeed, gone bankrupt.").
154. Anderson, supra note 39, at 415; INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND FACTSHEET: DEBT
RELIEF UNDER THE HEAVILY INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES (HIPC) INITIATIVE (Dec. 15, 2011),

http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm.
155. See Ordu, supra note 7, at 229, 263-64. In July 2005, 18 countries, specifically, 14 in
Africa, had 100% of their multilateral debts cancelled. Id. Argentina, Ecuador, Iraq, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Russia, Uruguay, and Ukraine have all had some debt forgiven and restructured. See
Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Haircuts: Estimating Investor Losses in
Sovereign Restructuring, 1998-2005, at 3-4 (IMF Working Paper No. 05-137, 2005); Nigeria To
Get $18bn Debt Relief BBC NEWS (June 30, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilbusiness
/4637395.stm.
156. Multilateral lending is nonprofit (e.g., World Bank), but there is also sovereign (stateallocated) and commercial lending. See MacCallum, supra note 142, at 428; Olufunmilayo B.
Arewa, Vultures, Hyenas, and African Debt: Private Equity and Zambia, 29 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 643, 644 (2009) (describing "potentially complex and varied" debt composition in
developing countries).
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2. 1980s "Remedies"
Rather than offering gratuitous solutions or directly addressing the
multinational bank lending that initiated the debt crisis, President
Reagan and British Prime Minister Thatcher promoted expansionist
neoliberal practices,1 57 privatizations,' 5 8 and debt restructuring.'s9 Such
initiatives sometimes compounded unsustainable debt problems for
amenable debtor countries, o many of which were still dictatorships or
in nascent stages of democratization.161 Drastic economic reforms
abated,162 but did not resolve high debt problems over the long run. 163
Recent numbers place developing world debt at over $1 trillion with
debt service at $179 billion per year.' 64 Nonetheless, the initiatives
during the 1980s led to two enduring systemic changes-(1) the IMF
became a leverage-bearing advisor, and (2? financial obligations became
more identifiable as property right assets.
While commercial banks initially reduced lending to developing
countries after Mexico's 1982 default,166 lending again increased.1 In
October 1985, Treasury Secretary James Baker (Baker Plan)
encouraged new loans to heavily-indebted countries and urged marketoriented reform, deregulation, privatization, and trade liberalization.168
Privatizations sometimes substantially-increased foreign ownership of
local assetsl69 and aggressive debt-for-equity swap programs replaced
debt claims with a more fungible property right, often with sufficient
liquidity to permit capital flight' 7 and drain foreign currency
157. Harvey, supra note 101, at 22-23
158. William M. Berenson, Current Legal Issues Affecting Central Banking, 29 GEO.
WASH. J.INT'L L. & EcoN. 337, 344 (1995).
159. See, e.g., International Debt Management Act of 1988,22 U.S.C. §§ 5321-5333.
160. See Rory Macmillan, The Next Sovereign Debt Crisis, 31 STAN, J. INT'L L. 305
(1995); BELLO, supra note 110, at 109; Alagiri, supra note 108, at 485.
161. See generally infra Part IV.C.
162. Sanford, supra note 40, at 345.
163. See id. at 347.
164. Charles Seavey, The Anomalous Lack of an International Bankruptcy Court, 24
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 499, 503 (2006). Furthermore, Sub-Saharan African debt was $218.4
billion in 2004; Ordu, supra note 7, at 229.
165. See infra notes 168-69, 172-75, 184-91, 197, 200-07.
166. Sylvester, supra note 10, at 265; BELLO, supra note I 10, at 109.
167. See William Darity, Jr., Did Commercial Banks Push Loans on the LDC's?, in
WORLD DEBT CRISIS 199-220 (M.P. Clauden ed., 1986).
168. Santos, supra note 81, at 76; Power, supra note 152, at 2714; GRANDIN, supra note
37, at 188; Sylvester, supra note 10, at 268-70.
169. Louis EMMERIJ & ENRIQUE IGLESIAS, RESTORING FINANCIAL FLOWS IN LATIN
AMERICA 182 (1991) (noting a substantial increase in foreign investment in Latin America and
attributing it to "debt-equity swap programmes" and "softening of host country regulations on
FDI").
170. See Elphanan Helpman, The Simple Analytics of Debt Equity Swaps, 79 AM. EcoN.
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reserves. 171 Similar proposals continued during the George Bush Sr.
administration with Treasury Secretary Brady's (Brady Plan) initiative
to further encourage countries to convert debt into marketable
securities.
The 1980s-era, which was dominated by debt-to-equity exchanges,
privatization, and austerity "Structural Adjustment Programs" (SAPs),
correlated with per capita income declines in Latin America and
Africa. 173 These economic reforms were fingered for what was called
the "lost decade" of the 1980s, because people living in poverty in
Africa and Latin America increased from 130 million (1980) to 180
million (early-1990s).1 74 In 1988, the U.N. International Childrens'
Emergency Fund (UNICEF) estimated that 650,000 children in
developing countries died as a result of "reduction in basic living
standards caused by diversion of resources to service external debt."
Reform results should be compared to the results of approaches to
economic development during the period that preceded the escalation in
lending. From the early-1950s to the mid-1970s, Latin America pursued
more closed economic development policies and aggregate per capita
REV. (1990) (stating that debt-for-equity swaps did not resolve financial problems); Sebastian
Edwards, Capital Flows, Foreign Direct Investment, and Debt-Equity Swaps in Developing
Countries 16, 18 (NBER Working Paper No. 3497, 1990); Paul Krugman, Market-Based DebtReduction Schemes 21-26 (NBER Working Paper No. 2587, 1988); Javier H. Rubenstein, Note,
The Federal Reserve Board's "Liberalization" of Restriction on LDC Debt-Equity Swaps, 20
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 163, 166 (1988) (stating that there was nationalist opposition to
foreign control over the "most lucrative investment opportunities"); Mugasha, supra note 68, at
869 (changing aggregate debt into market-traded bond instruments sometimes created
"profiteering ... [which was] worse than useless from the debtor countries' point of view").
171. Santos, supra note 81, at 87.
172. Sylvester, supra note 10, at 271; Santos, supra note 81, at 70, 79-80 (another Brady
Plan component was to encourage private banks to voluntarily reduce debt with creditor country
assistance, but results were negligible).
173. Jessica W. Miller, Solving the Latin American Sovereign Debt Crisis, 22 U. PA. J.
INT'L EcON. L. 677, 684-85 (2001). During the 1980 to 2000 period of globalization, developing
countries experienced an aggregate 6% GDP growth over twenty years with expanding income
gaps and impoverishment. JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE, supra note 99, at 264; Ted C.
Fishman, Making a Killing: The Myth of Capital's Good Intentions, HARPER'S MAG., Aug.
2002, at 34; BELLO, supra note I10, at 135 (stating that there was a 2.2% decline in Africa).
174. BELLO, at 84, 135 (citing Stephen Fidler, Trouble with Neighbours, FIN. TIMES, Feb.
16, 1993, at 15). There are critics of the "Washington Consensus." See, e.g., Antonio Perez,
Legal Frameworksfor Economic Transition in Iraq-OccupationUnder the Law of War vs.
Global Governance Under the Law of Peace, 18 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 53, 53 (2004); Chander,
supra note 8, at 1197 ("Progressive American critics of international law aim much of their fury
at the WTO and other economic institutions."). In Latin America "[b]etween 1980 and 1998 the heyday of free-market fundamentalism - median per capita income stagnated at 0 percent,"
income inequality rose, and "the total number of destitute grew to a full third of the population."
GRANDIN, supra note 37, at 198.
175. Sylvester, supra note 10, at 258-59.
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75%.176 In

1992,

115

Inter-American

Development Bank President Enrique Iglesias reported that SAPs
"largely cancelled out the progress of the 1960's and 1970's . . . [T]he

bulk of the costs of adjustment fell disproportionately on the middleand low-income groups, while the top five percent of the population
retained or, in some cases, even increased its standard of living.",'7 MIT
Economics Professor Rudiger Dornbusch noted that "developing
economies" stopped developing and slid into a "hole" of increased
unemployment, inequality, and poverty and dropping consumption. 7 8
Columbia Economics Professor Jeffrey Sachs writes that the "squeeze
of rising debt burdens and falling aid levels threw a large number of
poor countries into persistent stagnation or economic decline." 79
D. The 1990s "Washington Consensus"
After the Soviet Union collapsed, formerly socialist countries
denounced welfare states, free-trade agreements abounded, China
opened up to markets, almost all countries were more influenced by
globalization, the IMF and GATT/WTO grew in power and intensified
market liberalization agendas,s and privatizations were widespread but
sometimes bred controversial results.' 8 ' Neoliberalism became the
176. GRANDIN, supra note 37, at 198; see also Donald L. Huddle, Post-1982 Effects of
Neoliberalismon Latin American Development and Poverty: Two Conflicting Views, 45 EcoN.
DEV. & CULT. CHANGE 881 (1997) ("(GDP) increased by more than 6% per year, on average");
FDIC, supra note 118, at 192 (During the 1950s and 1960s, "the growth rate in the real domestic
product of the LDCs [developing countries] averaged about 6 percent annually.").
177. BELLO, supra note 110, at 135 (citing Enrique Iglesias, President of the IDB); PAUL
KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION EcoNOMICs (1999).

178. BELLO, supra note 110, at 134; Randall Peerenboom, Human Rights and Rule ofLaw:
What's the Relationship?, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 809, 857 (2005) ("Fifty-four countries were
poorer in 2000 than in 1990"); Jacques Polak, The Changing Nature of IMF Conditionality
(OECD Dev. Centre, Working Paper No. 41, 1991) (quoting Rudliger Dornbusch).
179. Jeffrey D. Sachs, Resolving the Debt Crisis of Low-Income Countries, 2002
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EcON. ACTIVITY 257, 266. "Developing-country external debt is an

economic, social, and political issue. The debt weighs heavily on the shoulders of the debtor
nations, crippling their domestic social and economic problems .. . . Individuals and families in
these countries are deprived of even the most basic elements of living." Mugasha, supra note 68,
at 859.
180. Chander, supra note 8, at 1197-98; Code of Good Practices on Transparency in
Monetary and Financial Policies: Declaration of Principles, 1999 INT'L MONETARY FUND
(Sept. 26,1999), http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/mae/mft/code/index.htm.
181. Bernard S. Black et al., Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What
Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1731, 1746-50 (2000). Some privatization processes were
plagued with corruption. Id at 1733. With Russian privatizations, several kleptocrats usurped
much of the economy. Id. Some privatizations caused tremendous wealth consolidation. See id
With Mexico's telecommunications industry privatization, Mexico's Carlos Slim became the
world's richest person at $59 billion. Brian Winter, How Slim Got Huge, FOREIGN POL. (Oct. 11,
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hegemonic discourse.1 82 President Clinton firmly supported globalization beyond preferences of most Congressional Democrats' and the
mutually-supportive policies among the World Bank, IMF, and U.S.
Treasury for economic integration during the 1990s were commonly
referred to as the "Washington Consensus."' 84 The economic integration
and power shift to the private sector was not spontaneous,' 8 but a
continuous and expected outcome from Reagan-Bush Sr. administration
agendas that sought to solidify property rights, open foreign investment
opportunities, and deepen IMF involvement in member countries.186
While this part has emphasized developing world countries that
confronted economic travail due to global financial relations, 8 7 the
post-WWII period also yields many success stories from globalization
Rapid
due to comparative advantage and efficient production.
2007), available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2007/10/11/how-slim got huge.
Capitalists in "China, India, and Russia . . . represent a new wave of wealth, power, and
influence" often by "being able to seize a political opportunity." Id. Barack Obama recently
expressed that the growing number of billionaires "make more in 10 minutes than a worker
makes in 10 months." Barbara Stark, Jam Tomorrow: Distributive Justice and the Limits of
InternationalEconomic Law, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 3, 4 (2010). Also, "the assets of the
world's richest three individuals exceeded the combined Gross National Production of all of the
least developed countries, with a population totaling 600 million people." Id. at 4-5.
182. Harvey, supra note 101, at 23.
183. Graham K. Wilson, Congress in Comparative Perspective, 89 B.U. L. REV. 827, 835
(2009).
184.

JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002); see also David P.

Fidler, The Return of the Standard of Civilization, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 137, 137 (2001); Naomi
Klein, International Human Rights & U.S. Foreign Policy: Bomb Before you Buy: The
Economics of War, 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 331, 332 (2004).

185. See Wyler, supra note 134, at 952-53; Tarullo, supra note 142, at 291. G-7 controls
45% and 162 other IMF members share remaining voting power. Id. at 292. G-8 controls 51%
of global GNP, and 49% of the world's exports. G8 Finance Minister's Meetings: G8 History
(2006), http://www.g8finance.rui/en/information/history/. In the United States, corporations
wield substantial power within the political arena. Bejesky, Politico-InternationalLaw, supra
note 37, at 69-71.
186. Sylvester, supra note 10, at 269-72. The initiatives were formerly part of the 1985
Baker Plan and additional lending was contingent on "debtor nations' submission to IMF
scrutiny of their economic policies." Id. at 269. Reagan-Bush Sr. policies were incorporated into
IMF/World Bank SAPs to reduce the role of government in the economy, lead to "a virtuous
cycle of growth, rising employment, and prosperity" and "repay their creditors by becoming
more efficient exporters." BELLO, supra note 110, at 134.
187. Oswaldo de Rivero: Debunking The Myths Of 'Development,' 52 UNESCO COURIER
69 (July/Aug. 1999) (interview by Araceli Ortiz de Urbin and Lucia Iglesias Kuntz) [hereinafter
de Rivero], available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/ 001165/l16578e.pdf (Peruvian
diplomat remarking that "[e]conomic development is one of the great myths of the 20th century.
. . . But the fact is that on the eve of the 21st century, more than 100 countries have not
developed."). Furthermore, globalization brought no cases of Third World prosperity. JOHNSON,
THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE, supra note 99, at 262.

188. See David Burton et al., Asia's Winds of Change, 43 IMF FIN. & DEv. (June 2006),
http://faculty.nps.edu/relooney/00-New_578.pdf.
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industrialization emerged in Japan during the 1950s through the 1970s,
in the Asian Tiger countries (e.g., Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea,
and Taiwan)' 89 during the 1970s and 1980s and in China and India from
the 1990s to the present day.' 90 These cases are remarkable and provide
abundant lessons for successful development. However, the additional
consideration is that much of the developing world was already carrying
unsustainable debt that decreased competitiveness, while countries were
being instructed to further open their economies and reap the benefits of
rapid industrialization that the Asian Tigers were experiencing.191 If one
group of countries, representing a small fraction of the "developing
world," 92 achieves rapid development with low wages by pursuing
export-led development to supply consumer demand that is ultimately
capped, then opportunities to supply in other low-wage countries will be
lower.193 Moreover, even the Asian Tigers were not immune from
economic crises from financial globalization.
E. Lacking CapitalControls
Deepening IMF involvement in institutional reforms opened a period
of failure of the original missions of improving currency convertibility
189.
190.

Id.
Id.

191.

Id.; see also JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE, supra note 99, at 263. The Asian

Tigers may not have been pursuing purely open market principles, but using Import Substitution
Industrialization strategies that build a diverse economy internally by protectionism. Kanayo
Ogujiuba et al., Import Substitution Industrializationas LearningProcess: Sub SaharanAfrican
Experience as Distortionof the "Good" Business Model, I Bus. & MGMT. REV. 8, 8-10 (2011),
http://www.businessjournalz.org/articlepdf/bmrn615l3.pdf. Asian Tigers also used Export-Led
Development, which refers to building an industrial base with high production that supplies
exports to global markets to aggregate wealth. The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998:
Adapting U.S. Intelligence and Policy-Making to the Challenges of Global Economics, Inst. for
the Study of Dipl. (Feb. 27, 2006), http://wwwl2.georgetown.edu/sfs/isd/AsianFinancial
Crisis WG Report.pdf. These approaches could be combined with protectionism and capped
domestic consumption. Six Deadly Sins: The Recent Troubles have Exposed many Myths About
the Tigers' past Economic Success, ECONOMIST, (Mar. 5, 1998), http://www.economist.com/
node/i 15047. Whether such policies undermine pure open market assumptions also depends on
relative purchasing power and existing exchange rates.
192. De Rivero, supra note 187, at 69. Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea only
represented 2% of the population of what was then the "developing world." Id.
193.

U.N.

CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN

AFRICA, DEBT SUSTAINABILITY: OASIS OR MIRAGE?, 8 (Sept. 30, 2004), http://www.unctad.org/

en/docs/gdsafrica2004len.pdf. "Some Asian countries with a strong manufacturing base chose
to restrict the increase of their debt indicators by expanding export volume . . . . Many other
developing countries did not adjust this way." Latin American consternation with global
competition has recently renewed with China's inexpensive exports. See Javier Santiso, OECD
Dev. Centre, THE VISIBLE HAND OF CHINA INLATIN AMERICA (2007) (discussing predictions and

concerns regarding future China/Latin America strategic partnerships).
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with stable exchange rates and permitting to draw on quotas to stabilize
currency value when capital accounts could be depleted.19 4 When the
Gold Standard ended and the IMF began to favor countries that exercise
fewer exchange controls,' 95 there was a new conflict with the sovereign
prerogative balance contained in Article VI, § 3 of the IMF Charter,
which permits members to "exercise such controls as are necessary to
regulate international capital movements." 96 Several factors interacted
to generate new problems.
First, the IMF adopted a leveraged-advisory role. To enforce loan
guarantees on member states, the IMF placed stricter conditionality
terms on countries in need of IMF credit,' amended its charter in 1992
to impose sanctions on countries in arrears on IMF loans,' 98 and
expanded its originally-ratified mission to advise on new regulatory
arenas, fiscal austerity measures, and SAPs.199 Professor Jeffrey Sachs
194. See generally IMF Articles, supra note 98; Padma Desai: Financial Crisis, Contagion,
and Containment 2 (2003), http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/i7515.pdf ("crisis-ridden
economies lost their decision-making initiatives under International Monetary Fund [IMF]
bailouts, which consisted of extreme monetary and fiscal discipline and unrealistic triple-policy
arrangements of floating exchange rates, free capital mobility, and a presumed monetary policy
autonomy."); id. at 2 (Washington policymakers and Wall Street financiers praised countries for
financially opening up and this led to significant currency inflows during the early-1990s that
were "massively short term, speculative, and destabilizing"). The latter goal of maintain capital
accounts is premised on the need to assist countries confronting economic crisis due to
international financial obligations, which is similar to government bailouts of domestic banking
systems. JOHN HARDT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30617, RUSSIA'S PARIS CLUB DEBT: U.S.

INTERESTS, July 18, 2000. State-level defaults can profoundly impact creditors and global
markets, and Russian Federation defaults in 1998 provide an example. William Basset & Mark
Carlson, Profits and Balance Sheet Developments at U.S. Commercial Banks, 2002 FED. RES.
BULL., June 2002, at 259, 276; ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
DEVELOPMENT (OECD), EXTERNAL DEBT STATISTICS 1998-2002, at 143 (2003).

AND

195. See generally supra Part III.B. Free trade agreements also depend on fairly
unrestrained currency conversion for commercial transactions. Horst K6hler, Managing
Director, International Monetary Fund, Speech at the WTO General Council Meeting on
Coherence: Cooperation in Trade and International Financial Integration (May 13, 2003)
(transcript available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2003/051303.htm).
196. IMF Articles, supra note 98, art. VI(3). A World Bank study in 1993 indicated that
"as recently as the early 1970s, few countries, whether industrial or developing were without
restrictions on capital movements." WORLD BANK, MANAGING CAPITAL FLOWS IN EAST ASIA 3

(1996). Developed economies in Europe maintained capital controls well into the 1970s. Id.
197.

See, e.g., IMF CONDITIONALITY (John Williamson ed., 1983); MANUEL GUITIAN,

FUND CONDITIONALITY: EVOLUTION OF PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES (1981).

198. John W. Head, Suspension of Debtor Countries' Voting Rights in the IMF: An
Assessment of the Third Amendment to the IMF Charter,33 VA. J. INT'L L. 591, 592 n.3, 601
n.39 (1993) (listing Cambodia, Iraq, Liberia, Peru, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Vietnam,
Zaire, and Zambia as targeted countries). Poor economic conditions and inability to repay
international loans may push privatizations and austerity programs, but financial crises may not
have been caused solely by debtor country actions. See generally supra Part III.
199. Ofer Elder, Reform of IMF Conditionality: A Proposal for Self-Imposed
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writes that the "IMF gets its way in the developing world because to
disagree publicly with the IMF is viewed in the international
community as rejecting financial rectitude itself."20 0 Perceptions of
disagreement revert back to the core values on which the IMF was
established.2 0 1 In authorizing new missions, ten countries have the votes
to carry out most decisions while Charter Amendments require an 85%
202
supermajority.
Second, the combination of the Reagan administration initiatives of
turning debt to equity and reducing government spending with austerity
programs during the 1980s, 203 and the Washington Consensus
preference for privatizations and massive foreign investment inflows
into liquid assets during the 1990s opened a higher percentage of
economies to capital flight. 204 For many developing countries, the vast
majority of capital flows never went to direct investment but to
speculation, extracting financial profits, and to investing in new, liquid

Conditionality, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 511, 511-16 (2005) (SAPs usurp sovereignty, undermine
development, and urge reform by reducing spending and government size, which are beyond the
IMF's originally authorized mission).
200. Jeffrey Sachs, The IMF and the Asian Flu, AM. PROSPECT 18 (Mar.-Apr. 1998).
201. The Bretton Woods system and the IMF were established to foster economic stability
through a global economic cooperation premised on voluntary sovereign consent to the system,
but the IMF's leverage-bearing advisory role is not entirely consistent with the consent to core
fundamentals that ratified the original agreement. See supra notes 98, 194-96; infra notes 20408.
202. Domenico Lombardi, An Unexpected Agenda Item at the Next IMF Annual Meeting,
BROOKINGS (Sept. 7, 2010), available at http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0907 imf_
lombardi.aspx. The top 20 economic powers possess over 70% of the vote and the remaining
166 member countries share 30% of the IMF vote. Vote allocation is based on member quotas(1) United States (16.74%), (2) Japan (6.01%), (3) Germany (5.87%), (4) United Kingdom
(4.85%), (5) France (4.85%), (6) China (3.65%), (7) Italy (3.19%), (8) Saudi Arabia (3.16%),
(9) Canada (2.88%), (10) Russia (2.69%), (11) Netherlands (2.34%), (12) Belgium (2.08%),
(13) India (1.88%), (14) Switzerland (1.57%), (15) Australia (1.47%), (16) Mexico (1.43%),
(17) Spain (1.38%), (18) Brazil (1.40%), (19) South Korea (1.33%), (20) Venezuela (1.21%).
IMF, IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Boardof Governors (Oct. 30, 2010),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.htm. There was recent
discussion of reallocating "at least 5%" of IMF voting power to under-represented member
countries. See Lombardi supra. However, this may have less relevance to cooperation when
frameworks have already been established by existing rules.
203. See supra Part III.C.2.
204. Liberalization drastically increased private capital inflows to African and Latin
American countries. Stiglitz, supra note 22, at 474. Inflows rose from $24 billion in 1990 to
$148 billion in 1997. BELLO, supra note 110, at 105; R. DORNBUSCH, DOLLARS, DEBTS AND
DEFICITS (1986). In the early-1990s, Mexico received $91 billion over four years even though
GDP was annually decreasing. BELLO, supra note 110, at 110 (citing Maxwell Cameron &
Vinod Agarwal, Mexican Meltdown: Markets and Post-NAFTA Financial Turmoil, 17 TmiRD
WORLD Q. 977 (1996)); WALDEN BELLO ET AL., DARK VICTORY 37-42 (1994) (finding that due

to 1980s SAPs, half of the population was living in poverty and 40% was unemployed).
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capital markets.2 05 Third, the IMF preference for free convertibility of
currency would seem to revise how the word "necessary" is interpreted
in Article VI. Promising to abide by floating exchange rates logically
reduces government prerogative to protect currency value and leaves an
economy more open to drastic market reactions if financiers wanted to
abruptly pull money out of the economy2 0 6 or engage in 2speculation that
reaps profits by betting on future currency value.0 Fourth, the
deregulation process and new technologies opened a system of
financialization in which political and economic growth and ideology
208
were united and financial motives drove markets and actors within a
system of computerized financial globalization. 209 The process
correlated with high corporate and investment profitability over the past
three decades. 210 Unlike the earlier system with pegged currency values
and formal exchange in assets, such as by trading in gold on demand,
drastic currency market reactions could follow instantly from the push
205. World Bank consultant Timothy Kessler explained that "the vast majority of foreign
capital was invested in Mexico for the unambiguous purpose of extracting financial rents, while
a decreasing proportion went to direct investment." BELLO, supra note 110, at 110 (citing
Timothy Kessler, Political Capital: Mexican Policy Under Salinas, 51 WORLD POL. 57 (Oct.
1998)). Three-fourths of the foreign capital flowed into financial markets and speculation. See
id. at 111. Mexico's financial authorities "fell under the influence of money managers." Id. at
112 (citing Jeffrey Sachs, Personal View, FIN. TIMES, July 30, 1997). When economic crisis hit
in late-1994, foreign investors rapidly pulled money out of the country. S. Neal McKnight,
Stepping Stones to Reform: The Use of Capital Controls in Economic Liberalization,82 VA. L.
REV. 859, 861-62 (1996). Even today there is lack of understanding about the operations of
private equity funds. See Arewa, supra note 156, at 650. Data in the mid-2000s revealed that
international private equity investments totaled $832 billion and that they were often being
structured in offshore jurisdictions to avoid reporting and regulatory requirements and were
"shrouded in secrecy." Id. at 648-49.
206. See generally supra Parts III.C.2, III.D; see infra notes 211-28.
207. McKnight, supra note 205, at 862-63. New freedom of investment rules and property
rights may be adopted without traditional domestic banking protections. Enhancing transparency
and distinguishing debt risks from equity risks were policies behind the Glass-Steagall Act in
the United States. ALDE, supra note 7, at 78. As for globally-driven financial deregulation
agendas, in 1999, Paul Krugman wrote that "modem financial markets, by creating many
institutions that perform bank-like functions but do not benefit on bank-type safety nets, have in
effect reinvented the possibility of traditional financial panics." Id. at 21. In 2003 Warren Buffet
labeled derivatives "financial weapons of mass destruction." Id.; see also Stiglitz, supra note 22,
at 483 (noting "inconsistency on the part of the advocates of strong international economic
agreements providing investor protections" when they "want strong government intervention in
setting standards, including standards for property protection.").
208.

GERALD A. EPSTEIN, FINANCIALIZATION AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 3 (2005); see also

William K. Tabb, The CentralityofFinance, 13 J. WORLD-SYSTEMS RES. 1 (2007).
209.

See REFORMING MONEY AND FINANCE TOWARD A NEW MONETARY REGIME (Robert

Guttman ed., 2d ed. 1997); ROBERT GUTTMAN, CYBERCASH: THE COMING ERA OF ELECTRONIC
MONEY (2003).

210. Engelbert Stockhammer, Financialisationand the Slowdown of Accumulation, 28
CAMBRIDGE J. EcoN. 719 (2004).
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of a button.
Consequently, during the 1990s, and often attributable to floating
exchange rates, economic and currency crises hit Argentina, Brazil,
Ecuador, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Thailand,
Turkey, Ukraine, and Venezuela. 2 1 1 Depleting a country's foreign
reserves approximates a risk similar to that of short-term debt, and
confronting this adverse condition was the rationale behind IMF paidin-capital rules to provide liquidity in times of need. 212 With widespread
currency collapses, the IMF provided short-term loans and temporarily
but in
supported currencies by replenishing capital accounts,2
exchange it proposed new austerity programs and pushed more
deregulation, 2 which ultimately backfired for some countries.
F. Explanations
Explanations abounded for the financier/banking reaction that
inexplicably pulled massive capital from countries to plummet currency
values. One popular explanation for the start of the crisis in formerly
strong economies is that "some foreign financiers discovered [in the
summer 1997] that they had lent huge sums to companies in East Asia
with unimaginably large debts." 216 Rather than alleviating "short-term"
debt on those companies, bank runs followed on entire countries, such
as South Korea and Indonesia2 17 because no one wanted to be left
211. Gelpern, supra note 1, at 391.
212. Financial Crisis in Asia: Hearing Before the Subcomms. on Asia & Pac. & Int'l
Econ. Policy & Trade of the H. Comm. on Int'l Relations, 105th Cong. 17 (1998), availableat
http://commdocs.house.gov/comnittees/intlrel/hfa47638.000/hfa47638Of.htm.
Lawrence H.
Summers, U.S. Department of Treasury Deputy Secretary, remarked that "[t]he dynamics in
these countries once they've gotten in trouble is in many ways like the dynamics of a bank
run.. .. [T]he bank will indeed fail if no one wants to be the last one out." Id.
213.

JOHNSON, BLOWBACK, supra note 98, at 211, 226-27 (lending $17 billion to Thailand,

$40 billion to Indonesia and $57 billion to South Korea. Foreign investors returned to buy
insolvent companies at "fire sale" prices).
214. Chander, supra note 8, at 1220.
215. Argentina received IMF loans and still faced long-term financial crisis, international
negotiations, defaults, and write-offs. After defaulting on $100 billion in government loans,
from September 2003 to March 2004, President Nestor Kirchner negotiated with the IMF and
multilateral lenders on terms that were essentially ultimatums to write-off much of the debt
because it could never be repaid. Angela Pruitt, Argentine Bonds May Weaken More, WALL Sr.
J., Sept. 24, 2003, at C15. GDP declined 16% annually, unemployment was 21.5%, 58% lived
below the poverty line, and GDP had dropped to $183 billion by 2005. BELLO, supra note 110,
at 125. Argentina accepted the IMF-U.S. Treasury Board recommendation to create a currency
board and have free exchange of pesos for U.S. dollars domestically, but Argentina eliminated
the currency board in 2002 and devalued the peso. GRANDIN, supra note 37, at 201.
216.

JOHNSON, BLOWBACK, supra note 98, at 209.

217. Marcus Miller & Pongsak Luangaram, Financial Crisis in East Asia: Bank Runs,
Asset Bubbles and Antidotes 2 (CSGR Working Paper No. 11/98, 1998), http://wrap.warwick.ac.
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holding a plummeting currency. Downward market spirals 2 18 in Asia
were labeled an "Asian Flu" 219 and in Latin America a "Tequila Effect"
that "originated in Mexico and spread to Brazil and Argentina." 220
Ironically enough, as this happened, U.S. equity prices between 1995
and 2000 grew 21.2% per year and U.S. stock market capitalization
tripled.22 1 This was partially due to a drastic increase in foreignownership of U.S. assets.22 2 The IMF remarked: "U.S. net inflows were
heavily tilted to FDI and portfolio equity, as foreigners took a stake in
strong domestic prospects." 223 Specifically, the more illiquid investment
flows to FDI comprised only about one-third of the average net foreign
inflows of $200 billion per year over this period.22 4 Equity prices
eventually plummeted and the remarkable stock market increases were
attributed to a "dot-com" bubble, driven by frenzy to invest in
uk/2114/1/WRAP Luangaram wpl 198.pdf.
218. The market is often treated as infallible, but imperfections should be foreseeable.
Adam Smith's "Invisible Hand" presumes that "firms in the pursuit of their self-interest, guided
only by competitively determined prices, lead to economic efficiency." Stiglitz, supra note 22,
at 484. "Cosian Bargaining" presumes that one need not consternate over "external" influences
but just "assign clear property rights, and market participants will, through a process of
bargaining, arrive at an efficient outcome." Id. at 484-85.
There is a grain of truth in both of these ideas, but unfortunately, only a grain.
Research over the past thirty years has shown that these propositions hold only
under highly restrictive conditions -conditions not satisfied by any modern
economy. ... [T]here is no longer a presumption that markets, by themselves,
will lead to efficient outcomes. Indeed, the presumption is the opposite.
Id.
219. The Downward Spiral of the Asian Tigers, BBC (Mar. 31, 1998), available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special-report/1998/asianeconomiccrises/72222.stm; Kristin J. Forbes,
The Asian Flu and Russian Virus: The InternationalTransmission of Crisis in Firm-Level Data,
63 J. INT'L ECON. 59 (2004).

220. Charles W. Calomiris, Lessons from the Tequila Crisis for Successful Financial
Liberalization, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y RES. (Oct. 1, 1999), available at

http://www.aei.org/article/15090.
221. Aart Kraay, The Dot-Com Bubble, the Bush Deficits, and the US Current Account, in
G7

CURRENT ACCOUNT IMBALANCES:

SUSTAINABILITY

AND ADJUSTMENT

2-3,

46 (2007),

availableat http://www.econ.upf.edu/docs/papers/downloads/847.pdf.
222. Benjamin Bridgman, Do Intangible Assets Explain High U.S. Foreign Direct
Investment Returns? The Role of Multinational Taxes, BUREAU EcON. ANALYSIS 2 (Feb. 2007),

availableat http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/PET07/PETO7-07-00279S.pdf.
223. Olivier Blanchard & Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, Global Imbalances: In Midstream?,
INT'L MONETARY FUND (Dec. 22, 2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/
2009/spnO929.pdf.
224. Kraay, supra note 221, at 2, 44. "During the second half of the 1990s, the United
States accumulated foreign assets and liability at the rate of $765 billion and $965 billion per
year. About two-thirds of this consisted of increases in the volume and value of equity
holdings." Id.
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overpriced Internet stocks. 225
Washington Consensus explanations followed for the "Asian Flu"
and "Tequila Effect." An IMF paper in June 1999 acknowledged
failures, but blamed mistakes on misinterpretation of economic
indicators. 226 Robert Rubin, President Clinton's Treasury Secretary,
acknowledged U.S. government mistakes in dealing with global fiscal
crisis:
Many faulted the United States for pressing emerging markets to
open up to external capital too fast. It is legitimate to ask . . . how

much responsibility the industrialized countries should bear. At
the Treasury Department . . . we emphasized the need for an

adequate institutional framework and appropriate policy regimes
in emerging markets. However, in hindsight, that emphasis
should have been more intense. 227
This explanation contends that impacted countries concurrently had
inadequate "institutions" and the Washington Consensus failed to notice
those weaknesses as financial globalization intensified. For example,
with a surplus fiscal balance and a current account deficit lower than
four percent of GDP, Indonesia had previously been regarded the
"darling of the investment community," but it suffered a bank run as
"foreigners and rich Indonesians withdrew their money in search of
safer banks and safer currencies." 228 An IMF managing director called
the Indonesian currency crisis a "blessing in disguise" that would permit
the IMF to push reforms on the nepotistic, authoritarian government.22 9
Alternatively, Princeton Professor Walden Bello found the sudden
appreciation for democracy and good governance confounding since the
IMF had provided the Suharto dictatorship with over $30 billion over a
three decade period but IMF officials purportedly knew and tolerated
that the regime regularly stole an estimated 30% of disbursements. 230
225. Id. at 1-3.
226. See BELLO, supra note 110, at 121. "[T]he original assumptions for economic growth,
capital flows, and exchange rates . .. were proved drastically wrong." Id.
227. Id. at 127.
228. Chander, supra note 8, at 1219.
229. Id. at 1220; see also Michael S. Bennet, Banking Deregulation in Indonesia: An
Updated Perspective in Light of the Asian FinancialCrisis, 20 U. PA. INT'L EcoN. L. 1 (1999).
230. BELLO, supra note 110, at 168; Combating Corruption in the Multilateral
Development Banks: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. 2 (2004)
(statement of Jeffrey Winter, Professor of Political Economy, Northwestern University) (May
13, 2004), available at http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/images/WintersTestimony.pdf.
Similarly, China's sustained and record-setting economic growth is not due to transparent and
strong property rights, steadfast adherence to market principles, deregulation, or
democratization. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Invoking the Rule ofLaw in Post-Conflict Rebuilding:
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The U.S. Congress investigated and established the International
Financial Institutional Advisory Commission (FIAC).2 3 1 In March 2000,
the Commission stated that "the International Monetary Fund, the
World Bank and the regional development banks should write-off in
their entirety all claims against heavily indebted poor countries."2 3 2 The
World Bank and other multilateral non-profit lending institutions, such
as the Inter-American Development Bank, Asian Development Bank,
and the African Development Bank, were created to alleviate poverty in
poor countries by providing low interest rate loans; but the FIAC report
controversially claimed that the World Bank's performance was weak in
alleviating world poverty.2 3 3 The report does not emphasize the debt
crisis impact of high interest private sector loans 2 34 or that the IMF had
a history of providing a "bail-out for Western banks" during financial
turmoil. * The FIAC further determined that the IMF's role should be
limited to providing liquidity but "eligible member countries must
permit, in a phased manner over a period of years, freedom of entry and
operation for foreign financial institutions." 2 6
G. Concluding Points
Developing countries followed a pattern of opening to financial
globalization pursuant to economic cooperation, which is fundamentally
premised on international law and the continuity of sovereign financial

A CriticalExamination, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1347, 1364 (2008); Robert Bejesky, Investing
in the Dragon: Managing the Patent Versus Trade Secret Protection Decision for the
MultinationalCorporationin China, 11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 437, 445-51,474-79 (2004).
231. IFIAC, supra note 100.
232. Id. Perhaps this requires ignoring the terms of AAA-rated global bonds. See Global
Bonds, WORLD BANK (n.d.), http:// treasury.worldbank.org/cmd/pdf/InvestorBriefsGlobalBonds.
pdf. Or, it could shift losses to taxpayers in creditor countries.
233. IFIAC, supra note 100; Dani Rodrik, Why is There Multilateral Lending (NBER
Working Paper No. 5160, 1995) (discussing that multilateral lending improved growth).
234. See IFIAC, supra note 100. "The G-7 governments that have pointed an accusatory
finger in the direction of private capital markets are the same ones that have dragged their feet
again and again in terms of granting permanent debt relief." Arturo C. Porzecanski, From Rogue
Creditors to Rogue Debtors: Implications of Argentina's Default, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 311, 315
(2005). The origin of the debt crises was ostensibly commercial loan pushing. See generally
supra Parts III.A-C. Statistics from 1970 to mid-1990 illustrate that multilateral lending flows
decreased with increasing private sector lending. See Dipak Dasgupta & Dilip Ratha, What
Factors Appear to Drive Private Capital Flows to Developing Countries? And How Does
Official Lending Respond? (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper 2392, 2000); Rodrik,
supra note 233.
235. STIGLITZ, supra note 37, at 217; Sachs, supra note 179, at 4 (stating that there is a
"moral hazards" dilemma of indiscriminate lending due to expectation of IMF bailouts);
McKnight, supra note 205, at 862-63.
236. IFIAC, supra note 100.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol24/iss1/4

34

Bejesky: Currency Cooperation and Sovereign Financial Obligations

2012]

CURRENCY COOPERATION AND SOVEREIGN FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS

I125

obligations.23 7 Unsustainable accounts and economic hardship seem to
breed today's odious debt questions. The next part considers the
potentiality that odious leaders violated the principal/agent relationship
with their populations by commencing debt escalation or restraining
subsequent populist challenges to aggregating debt. There is also the
possibility that foreign influences on debtor governments were
sometimes so substantial that domestic populace will and selfdetermination were violated by those relations. This government and
agent, principal/populace fiduciary responsibility question is discussed
within the context of international law, foreign affairs, and precedent.

IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND

IDENTIFYING THE "ODIoUS AGENT"

A. The "State" as Actor and Person
Several international law doctrines ground the continuity of
sovereign financial obligations. First, members of the international
community provide perpetual "gerson status" to countries when
granting de jure recognition. 38 Except under extraordinary
conditions, 239 this threshold, collective acceptance of the entity is
maintained without revocation even though "states " are punished for
regime characteristics. 240 Second, to establish a status quo of propitious
international relations, sovereignty affirms that states are independent
and have the right to pursue self-interests, but also that states are actors
that inherit international rights and obligations of predecessor
governments.241 Third, pacta sunt servanda represents that "every treaty
237.
238.

See supra Part III.B; see infra Part IV.A.
Charles L. Cochran, De Facto and De Jure Recognition: Is there a Difference?, 62

AM. J. INT'L L. 457 (1968).

239. Anomalistic denial of dejure status includes democratic Taiwan, which has long been
informally treated as sovereign, but was not given recognition so to avoid exasperating relations
with China. Jean C. Wen, Note, One China, Freely and Fairly Elected: A New Solution to the
Issue of Taiwan, 21 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 87 (2007). Iraq, under Hussein, represents a situation
where the "state" is given only marginal diplomatic respect. Afghanistan, under the Taliban, was
called a "failed state." Abbas Djavadi, Afghanistan is a Failed States, But not Beyond Saving,
RADIO FREE EUROPE (Feb. 16, 2009), http://www.rferl.org/content/Afghanistan IsA Failed
State But Not BeyondSaving_/1493896html; Frank Gardner, Who's Who in the Axis of
Evil, BBC NEws (Dec. 20, 2003), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/l988810.stm.
240. In the United States, major legislative vehicles that stigmatize include the Trading
with the Enemy Act (1917), the Hickenlooper Amendment (1976), and the Helm's Burton Act
(1996). Pdrez & Weissman, supra note 28, at 731. During the Cold War, Soviet bloc countries
and China were labeled "enemies" and more recently the Bush administration called Iran, Iraq,
Syria, Libya, North Korea, and Cuba "axis-of-evil" countries. Gardner, supra note 239.
241. HUGO GROTIus, II DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, ch. IX, §§ 8, 12 (1625), translatedin
HUGO GROTIUS, OF THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 221-22, 229-30 (J. Morice trans., 1715).
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in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them
in good faith," which affirms systemic continuity of international laws,
rights, and obligations irrespective of government turnover.242 For a
legitimate international loan, the borrowing government/agent receives
the present financial value, the populace/principal receives an increase
in current economic utility, and the agent promises to repay that value,
binding the debt obligation on the state entity, 24 3 and derivatively, the
population. For the contracting lender, a state's economic and financial
condition forms a credit risk,2 44 but perpetual sovereign existence
permits lenders to rely on droits acquis with vested contract rights and
interestS24 5 to reduce repayment risk. 46
To assess the interaction between principal/agent fiduciary
obligations and continuity of international financial obligations,
consider a simplified typology of three modes that can terminate a
government's continuity-(1) physical territorial transformation to the
state's borders, (2) drastic regime/ideological turnover, or (3) stable
political turnover. Only the first circumstance doctrinally questions
continuity of rights and obligations vis-a-vis other states under
international law. 7 The second involves substantial ideological or even
revolutionary shifts24 8 that may challenge obligations with other states.
242. Id.; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, 74-75, May 23, 1969, 8
I.L.M. 679, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention], http://www.ilsa.org/jessup/
jessup1 l/basicmats/VCLT.pdf (explaining that even in the most degenerated relations, such as
in breaking of consular relations or during hostilities, treaties normally will remain in effect).
243. Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097
(explaining the binding nature of state promises); ARTHUR KEITH, THE THEORY OF STATE
SUCCESSION, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ENGLISH AND COLONIAL LAW 2-3 (1907) (explaining

that early scholars accepted debt continuity presumptions); Buchheit et al., supra note 1, at
1203; James Thuo Gathii, The Sanctity of Sovereign Loan Contracts and its Origins in
Enforcement Litigation,38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 251, 251-54 (2006).

244. See generally supra Parts III.B-C; Alan K. Audi, Iraq'sNew Investment Laws and the
Standard of Civilization: A Case Study on the Limits of InternationalLaw, 93 GEO. L.J. 335,
350 (2004). The World Bank will scrutinize accounts to assess debt bearability, but it does not
discriminate with risk-based interest rates. Id. Sanford, supra note 40, at 384 ("[G]ovemments
provide credit to other governments less on the basis of creditworthiness than on the basis of
their own foreign policy calculations.").
245. Thomas Ebenroth & Matthew James Kemmer, The Enduring Political Nature of
Questions of State Succession and Secession and the Questfor Objective Standards, 17 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 753, 776 (1996); Tamara Lothian, The Criticism of the Third-World Debt and
the Revision ofLegal Doctrine, 13 WIS. INT'L L.J. 421, 423, 457-59 (1995).
246. Ludington & Gulati, supra note 40, at 600 ("The theory is that states never die.
Instead, the state exists separately from its government, and because governments contract debts
as agents of the state, new governments necessarily inherit the debts of the old.").
247. Without a profound state transformation, the "capacities, rights and duties" remain at
government turnover. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 129, § 208, cmt. a.
248. Carsten Thomas Ebenroth & James Kemner, The Enduring Political Nature of
Questions of State Succession and Secession and the Quest for Objective Standards,17 U. PA. J.
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The third is the general form of government turnover today, perhaps
substantially due to influences from globalization, democratization
movements, and a relatively higher standard of living across the
world.2 49 While it may seem logical that more drastic state
transformations would most challenge commercial and debt obligations,
practice is not so clear.
B. Type One
With historical instances that have been forcible or peaceable,
unexpected or predictable, and riddled with legal complexity,250 state
succession has produced much debate over continuity of rights and
obligations under international law.251 Because the number of states
grew from 74 in 1946 to 192 today, 252 state succession was an intenselyactive area of the law. Sovereign restructuring can expand territory,
such as with the unification of East and West Germany in 1990, or
involve dismemberment and breakup, such as with the former Soviet
Union and former Yugoslavia. 253 Debt was assumed when Germany
united254 and transfers of British-controlled Hong Kong and Portuguesecontrolled Macau to China involved acceptance of economic rights and
255
With pressure from the international community, the
obligations.
secedinF Soviet Republics accepted debt obligations during the
1990s.2 During the 1980s, Yugoslavia was one of the ten most
but after years of detailed
indebted developing countries,
INT'L ECON. L. 753, 754 (1996) (quoting Abraham Lincoln for the right of people to choose a
drastic revolutionary movement in a territory to govern their own affairs, and Hersh Lauterpacht
for the political question of whether the international community recognizes internal populace
movements within a territory). It could accompany transformative institutional, cultural, and
value reform and be driven by drastic reaction social and economic circumstances, such as
poverty.
249. Bejesky, Politico-InternationalLaw, supra note 37, at 32-33, 70-71.
250. Ochoa, supra note 1, at 125-26;
COMMERCIAL OBLIGATIONS 4-5, 26-27 (2006).

TAi-HENG CHENG, STATE SUCCESSION

AND

251. Carsten Stahn, The Agreement on Succession Issues of the Former Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 379 (2002); Paul Williams & Jennifer Harris, State
Succession to Debts & Assets: The Modern Law and Policy, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 355 (2001);
KEITH, supra note 243, at 1-7 (noting early disagreement under international law regarding
rights and obligations).
252. See Member States, UNITED NATIONS (n.d.), http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.
html.
253. Agreement on Succession Issues Between the Five Successor States of the Former
State of Yugoslavia, June 29, 2001, 41 I.L.M. 3 (2002).
254. Anderson, supra note 39, at 423-24.
255.

CHENG, supra note 250, at 209, 233-34.

256. Williams & Harris, supra note 251, at 369-70, 408-10. See generally CHENG, supra
note 250, at 374-75.
257. Anderson, supra note 39, at 425 (telling about Yugoslavia's nearly $20 billion debt at
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negotiations, 258 the five successor states accepted IMF and Paris Club
apportionment conditions and percentages.
Debt continuity followed these territorial transformations even
though rules are unclear. The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties provides exceptions to pactasunt servanda in the event of state
transformations 260 and the Restatement (Third) on Foreign Relations
explains that a "successor state" that "wholly absorbs another state" or
"takes over part of the territory of another state" is not a mere
government succession but a significant event that can fracture
"continuity of statehood." 26 1 The Restatement Reporter's note calls the
international law of state succession "uncertain" and "confused."2 6 2 The
International Law Commission sought to codify succession rules in the
Convention on State Succession in Respect of Treaties in 1978, and
even debt continuity standards in the Vienna Convention on State
Succession in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts in 1983,
but only the former has entered into force and it is questionable whether
principles are followed.26 3
Article 38 of the Vienna Convention espouses a "clean slate" (tabula
rasa doctrine) 264 as the default rule, such that territorial transfers and
state dissolutions form newly independent successor states
unencumbered by debt repayment obligations absent assent. 265 If debt is
assumed, that acceptance might be viewed as an act of populace
gratuity. However, Article 39 provides that debt does transfer when
states unite, while Article 41 explains that fracturing states should agree
to assume predecessor debt.2 66 The construct is logical as individual
attributes of parts are incorporated into a whole entity that unifies assets
and liabilities, while pieces of a former entity may be substantially
approximately 18% interest).
258. See generally Stahn, supra note 251, at 390-93; Milena Sterio, Implications of the
Altmann Decision on Former Yugoslav States, 20 CONN. J. INT'L L. 39, 46-47 (2004).
259. See generally UNHCR, State Succession to the Immovable sets of Former
Yugoslavia, Feb. 20, 1997, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,ICG,,BIH,,3ae6a6cfl0,0.
html.
260. Anderson, supra note 39, at 403-04.
261.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 129, at 208.

262. Id. at 208, Reporter's Note 1; Reina, supra note 71, at 583-84 (explaining that a
myriad of factors will influence the legal personality of the "new" state entity and succeeding
legal rights and responsibilities).
263. Reina, supra note 71, at 586.
264. Mark A. Drumbl, Book Review, Tai-Heng Cheng, State Succession and Commerical
Obligations, 6 CHINESE J. INT'L 254, 254 (2006), available at http://chinesejil.oxfordjoumals.
org/content/6/1/254.full.
265. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of States Property, Archives
and Debts art. 38, Apr. 7, 1983, 22 I.L.M. 298, 323, http://www.concemedhistorians.org/
content files/file/et/172.pdf.
266. Id. at 324.
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dissimilar, such as with natural resources or a larger population.
Even with guiding principles and precedent, successions are
foremost political acts with two-level dynamics that may not entirely be
circumscribed by generally applicable rules.267 Diplomatic power or
impositions may be probative to understanding the ultimate result. 26 8 in
a dissenting opinion in the International Court of Justice's SFRY state
personality case, Judge Dimitrijevic wrote that succession is a sovereign
and "decentralized" act, but continuity of a predecessor state into the
succeeding state is not based on "self-perception but on the perception
of others."269 Professor Malcolm Shaw emphasizes that there may be
political pressure on successor states "to establish their international
creditworthiness by becoming involved in debt allocation arrangements
in circumstances where in strict international law this may not be
necessary."270 Debts may be assumed to attain political recognition,
international institution membership, and military and market aid, and
to avoid exclusion from capital markets.2 7'
Despite the many principal/agent and entity status parallels between
corporations and states, a critical distinction actuates ODD questions.
State succession fractures the perpetual person status, which is
analogous to combinations of corporate mergers and acquisitions,
restructuring, and chartering a new corporation. However, when a
corporation has ailing financial accounts, domestic laws may permit
restructuring, suspending, or adjudicating debt. 272 In the United States, a
bankrupt corporation without prospects for continuity may enter
liquidation proceedings and dissolve, or enter Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code to renegotiate financial obligations with creditors.2 7 3
Chapter 9 provides protection for local governments and prevents court
orders from interfering with "(1) any of the political or governmental
powers of the debts; (2) any of the property or revenues of the debtor; or
267. CHENG, supra note 250, at 13-14.
268. Equitable results may depend on before and after calculations of net credit and debt
of the sovereign's debt holders (i.e., citizenry) and creditor stakeholders. The extent that debt is
restructured or lessened is based on diplomacy that presumably attempts to represent the
interests of respective debtors and creditors. Id. at 71; Lee C. Buchheit & Ralph Reisner, The
Effect of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Process on Inter-CreditorRelationships, 1988 U.
ILL. L. REv. 493 (discussing inter-bank relations when faced with the possibility of debt
restructuring and decisions to refrain from legal action).
269. Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case concerning
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. V. Serb. & Montenegro), 2003 I.C.J. 122, 45 (Feb. 3) (Dimitrijevic, J.,
dissenting), availableat http://icj-cij.org/docket/files/122/8258.pdf.
270.

MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 902 (5th ed. 2003).

271.
272.
273.

King, supra note 1, at 620.
Tarullo, supra note 142, at 303-04.
Buchheit et al., supra note 1, at 1207.
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(3) the debtor's use or enjoyment of any income-producin property." 274
While there have been proposals and nascent initiatives, there is no
such legal framework available to states in international law. 276 State
debt obligations remain and payments either draw down on outstanding
principal, or they increase if debt is unsustainable with ad hoc
diplomacy being employed to confront debt crises. 2 77 Critical
perceptions about accumulated external obligations may even be one
factor that leads to the second form of self-determination shift.
C. Type Two
1. Security Threats and Socialism
An ideological self-determination reorientation may change
perceptions about international obligations. 278 Iraq, after invasion, broke
from the previous regime, but it accepted rather than rejected
international obligations. 79 However, the more common form of drastic
shift was the practice of repudiating international obligations to the
274. 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2000).
275. Bankruptcy approaches could address ODD questions. Sachs, supra note 179, at 26061; Power, supra note 152, at 2766-67; Santos, supra note 81, at 70. The IMF's proposed
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism considered creditor priority, a stay on dissenting
creditors, and debt restructuring negotiations. William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign
Debt Reform andthe Best Interest of Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1, 26-43 (2004).
276. Geoffrey R. Watson, The Law of State Succession, in CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 121-24 (Ellen G. Schaffer & Randall J. Snyder eds., 1997).

277. See generally Jeffrey Sachs, The Roadblock to a Sovereign BankruptcyLaw, 23 CATO
J. 5 (2003) (creditor states may fear significant capital loss in multinational financial
institutions); Brett H. Miller, Note, Sovereign Bankruptcy: Examining the United States
Bankruptcy System as a Forum for Sovereign Debtors, 22 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1 (1991)
(examining bankruptcy law's application to sovereign debtors). It is uncertain how different
classes of debts would receive priority (e.g., "odious," level of value provided, or another
standard). Also, an institutionalized bankruptcy system might beget sovereign agreements that
open jurisdiction and identify and execute on assets in exchange for the bankruptcy promise to
alleviate debt, which could involve assets with a higher future value than debt owed. This
possibility theoretically parallels debt-to-equity and privatization as debt accounts were
transformed into more identifiable and liquid assets, enforceable as domestic property rights,
and subject to capital flight.
278. Lothian, supra note 245, at 423-25, 462 (emphasizing self-determination
characteristics of debt crisis).
279. Iraq's borders never changed, although sub-national regional governments in a
federal system were created. Sameera Fazili & Adil Ahmad Haque, Breaking, Buying, and
Building Nations, 30 YALE J.INT'L L. 367, 367 (2005). "Ability to repay" questions remained at
the central government level in Baghdad. ODD discussions, led primarily by the Bush
administration, created a perception of a revolutionary "movement" (dictatorship to democracy).
Iraq's circumstance of accumulating debt, being closed due to externally-imposed sanctions, and
drastically opening the economy with international debt forgiveness, is the opposite of open
economies that became closed or protectionist, and challenged debt obligations.
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chagrin of other members of the international community during the
bipolar Cold War. While the position was not limited to promulgations
of communism, 280 the most prevalent and extreme movements did come
from Soviet allies, the People's Republic of China, and Cuba, which
maintained mutual rights and obligations, but viewed the external
capitalist order as a system that undermined sovereignty and selfdetermination. 28 During international convention negotiations, this
faction of countries even objected to debt continuity in state succession
movements and advocated for financial "clean slates." 282 Contrarily,
from a Western lens, adhering to international economic obligations and
supporting capitalist relations were presumed to be the norm, which
might mean that countries rejecting economic integration agreements
and foreign investment, particularly after treaties promised adherence,
283
were arguably rejecting international law and cooperation.
However,
most pertinent to ODD applicability is that countries struck with debt
crises were overborrowing from Western banks, which is logical
because it would have been ideologically-inconsistent for communist
dictators to aggregate profligate debt from international capitalist
280. See infra Parts IV.C.3-4. Iran rejected the U.S.-supported Shah's debts, particularly to
purchase weapons, as odious after his 25-year dictatorship was overthrown in 1979. Ludington
& Gulati, supra note 40, at 600. Two decades of poor economic conditions ostensibly led to
President Chavez's popularity in Venezuela and support for leftist and protectionist economic
policies. Mario J. Garcia-Serra, The "EnablingLaw:" The Demise of the Separation of Powers
in Hugo Chavez's Venezuela, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 265, 268-70 (2001); Angel Luis
Olivera Soto, PriorRestraints in Venezuela's Social Responsibility on Radio and Television
Act: Are They Justfied?, 40 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 401, 406 (2008); see supra note 211.
281. They presumed capitalist profiteering created usurious obligations and that debt could
not legitimately be imposed on the people. A. HELLER ET AL., DICTATORSHIP OVER NEEDS: AN
ANALYSIS OF SOVIET SOCIETIES 127-66 (1983). For example, in 1911, the Imperial Chinese

Government issued bonds to finance the construction of the Hukuang Railway. Jackson v.
People's Republic of China, 550 F. Supp. 869, 872 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding China liable to
repay the 72-year old debt with interest). In 1947 Chaing Kai-shek promised to repay the bonds.
Id. at 872. When Mao and the Communist Party came to power in 1949, China ceased
payments. Id. See generally Timothy Ashby, U.S. Certified Claims Against Cuba: Legal Reality
and Likely Settlement Mechanisms, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 101 (2009) (discussing

Cuba's expropriations in 1959 and 1960, and U.S. individuals and corporations with property
right claims certified by the Federal Claims Settlement Commission). Karl Marx's lending
theory was that bank loans and interest-carrying capital lacked a physical asset or production
value but interest generated future payment flow to the creditor. See generally KARL MARX,
CAPITAL, VOL. III (Friedrich Engles ed., Int'l Publishers 1959) (1895). More contemporary,
"dependency theory" arguments, were developed as the debt crisis unfolded. See generally
FERNANDO H. CARDozo & ENZo FALETTO, DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA

(Majory M. Urquidi trans., 1979); ANDRE GUNDER FRANK, DEPENDENT ACCUMULATION AND
UNDERDEVELOPMENT (1979); Stark, supra note 181, at 9-16 (contemporary perspective on

Marx).
282.

See generally YILMA MAKONNEN, THE NYERERE DOCTRINE 20-33 (1984).

283.

MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 671

(1991).
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relations. 284
In addition to expedient, propaganda-dominant circumstances
involving Iraq and the possibility of current multinational bank
stakeholders and American taxpayer losses, another reason the strong
scholarly support for incorporating an ODD into commercial relations
never appeared on the U.S. foreign policy agenda is that it might have
opened a Pandora's Box of embarrassment by retroactively examining
the history of Western support for unpalatable, but market-oriented,
regimes. During the Cold War, and generally with the justification of
fighting communism, U.S. officials were engaged in combinations of
initiating and supporting coups, organizing insurgent and covert
operations against leftist governments, and supporting controversial
regimes in various parts of the world.2 8 6 Professor Chalmers Johnson
refers to U.S. administrations "prop[ping] up repressive regimes or their
militaries and police forces," generally against left-wing populace
interests. 287 NYU Latin American History Professor Greg Grandin
284.

See generally supra Parts III.B-C; MILLET & TOUSSAINT, supra note 93, at 120-21

(contending the developing world debt crisis was a sovereignty-usurping wealth transfer to
creditors and a new form of colonialism); DAVID HARVEY, THE NEW IMPERIALISM (2003).

285. Sack's disquisition was published in 1927 and for over three decades the world has
been cognizant of unsustainable developing world debt that frequently amassed from
overborrowing by kleptocraticdictators.
286. Chalmers Johnson, Porter Goss' Worthless Intelligence Agency, ALTERNET (Nov. 24,
2004), available at http://www.alternet.org/story/20600/?page=I; Marcus Eyth, The CIA and
Covert Operations:To Disclose or Not to Disclose- That is the Question, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 45,
50 (2002) ("During the forty-year period following the Second World War, there were few areas
of the world with which the CIA was not covertly connected."); David Wise, Covert Operations
Abroad: An Overview, in THE CIA FILE (Robert L. Borosage & John Marks eds., 1976); Howard
Zinn, Afterward, in ANTHONY ARNovE, IRAQ: THE LOGIC OF WITHDRAWAL 109-10; JOHNSON,

THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE, supra note 99, at 32; Bejesky, Geopolitics, supra note 51, at 202-10;
GRANDIN, supra note 37, at 4, 48-50; LESLEY GILL, THE SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS: MILITARY
TRAINING AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAS 60-78, 137 (2004); Mark A. Drumbl,

Collective Violence andIndividual Punishment: The Criminalityof Mass Atrocity, 99 Nw. U.L.
REV. 539, 604 (2005) (Global powers coddled and supported dictators and only denounced them
later.); see generally THE SUN NEVER SETS: CONFRONTING THE NETWORK OF FOREIGN US

MILITARY BASES (Joseph Gerson & Bruce Birchard eds., 1991); Bill Quigley, The Casefor
Closing the School of the Americas, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 1 (2005).
287.

JOHNSON, BLOWBACK, supra note 98, at 65; ROBERT DREYFUss, DEVIL'S GAME 308

(2005) (During the Cold War "the United States propped up dictators, kings, emirs, and
presidents-for-life . . . around the world" and the opponents were left-wing interests.). Nobel
Laureate Jody Williams explains U.S. foreign policy by noting: "We support democracy when
it's convenient to the interests of the United States of America." DVD: Hijacking Catastrophe:
9/11 Fear & Selling American Empire (Media Education Foundation, 2006) (Interview with
Williams); GILL, supra note 286, at 137.

The release of a list of some 60,000 SOA graduates in 1993 revealed the
names of some of the hemisphere's most notorious dictators, death squad
operatives, and assassins, and when human rights activists began comparing
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explains that up through the late-i 970s, "most of Latin America" was
ruled by "corrupt, deadly, but pro-American dictatorships . . . "288 which
coincided with those governments accepting loans and accumulating
sovereign debt. 289 In the early-1980s, when U.S. support for undemocratic regimes was readily recognized, Reagan's U.N. Ambassador
Jeane Kirkpatrick provided a connotative explanation by calling proSoviet communist states "totalitarian" and pro-Western dictatorships
"authoritarian."290
Existing international agreements predisposed those relations in the
Western Hemisphere. In 1946, the U.S. military established the School
of the Americas (SOA) in Panama.291 Months later, the United States
consummated a military defense treaty with Latin American countries
that empowered signatories to act collectively against outside
aggression,292 which was sometimes thereafter extrapolated to presume
that there was Soviet influence on the domestic population for
preferring leftist-policy agendas.293 The SOA trained with pro-U.S.
goals as a uniting ideological force and formed a transnational alumni
association that permitted U.S. military influence within Latin
American governments.29 4 In School of the Americas, Professor Lesley
these names to those listed in a variety of truth commission reports, the
results were starling: SOA graduates took part in some of the worst human
rights atrocities in the Cold War.
Quigley, supra note 286, at 1; JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE, supra note 99, at 68, 136;
PRICSCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND ATROCITY

14-15 (2001) (Over twenty truth commission records are examples of conducting investigations
that document actions by brutal regimes.).
288.

GRANDIN, supra note 37, at 69.

289.

See generally AUTHORITARIANS AND DEMOCRATS: REGIME TRANSITION IN LATIN

AMERICA (James M. Malloy & Mitchell A. Seligson eds., 1987); AUTHORITARIANISM AND
CORPORATISM IN LATIN AMERICA (James M. Malloy ed., 1977); RALPH PETERS, NEW GLORY

174-75 (2005) (attributing failure of globalization to improve living standards partially on
corruption). The pervasiveness of corruption has resulted in extensive country-rankings and
indices. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, Global Corruption Barometer 2010, available at

Corrupt
Foreign
http://www.transparency.org/policy research/surveysindices/gcb/20 10;
Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd(1)(2) (amended 1988) (pervasiveness of sovereign
debt led to U.S. legislation).
290.

DREYFUSS, supra note 287, at 316; GRANDIN, supranote 37, at 76; Y [Louise Halle],

On a Certain Impatience with Latin America, FOREIGN AFF., 565-79, July 1950; NOAM
CHOMSKY, DETERRING DEMOCRACY 44, 51-57, 199-201 (1992) ("From an early stage in the

Cold War . . . the United States was set on a course against self-determination and
democracy.").
291.
292.

JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE, supra note 99, at 136.
GRANDIN, supra note 37, at 4, 40.

293. See supra notes 285-88; infra notes 305-06, 331-34.
294. One Secretaria del Ej6rcito in 1993 explained that SOA goals were "to support the
political systems of the United States and its allies; to attack the legitimacy and credibility of the
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Gill writes:
The United States aided and abetted [consolidation of power] ...
by arming preferred leaders, intervening militarily to prop them
up when necessary, and using threats, loans, diplomatic pressure,
and other techniques to control governments in power . . .
National security apparatuses . . . [were] able to deploy lethal
violence . . . [and military connections allowed the United States

to] exert greater control over its Latin American allies. 295
2. Examples
Examples of assistance to foreign leaders illustrate the relevance to
ODD analyses. In 1964, a coup overthrew the democratically-elected
Jodo Goulart government in Brazil and two decades of strict military
rule followed.26 After repeated denials, 297 later released White House
documents and audiotapes indicated Johnson administration involvement in the coup events by providing weapons and using covert
actions.298 U.S. administrations continued to support the Castello
enemy; to publicize the reforms and program implemented for the benefit of the population . . .;
and to win the loyalty or induce the surrender of enemy forces." GILL, supra note 286, at 12829. "Nationalist rhetoric represented a bid by Latin American students to claim a measure of
symbolic equality with the United States . . . . " Id. at 127. "Doing things the American way
entailed the formation of complex, power-laden relationships through which U.S. officials
cajoled, manipulated, and made demands of Latin American armies." Id. at 136. "The SOA ...
cultivated working relationships between U.S. and Latin American officers, and it facilitated
U.S. efforts to dominate regional militaries with strong nationalistic sensibilities." Id. SOA
graduates are "lifetime colleagues who are promoted together-at least theoretically-and
whose career paths constantly intersect." Id. at 120.
295. Id. at 60.
296. Steve Kingstone, Brazil Remembers 1964 Coup d'etat, BBC NEWS, Apr. 1, 2004. See
generally An American in Brazil, President Jodo Goulart and Brazil, 23 ANTIOCH REV. 313
(1963).
297. Robert F. McFadden, Lincoln Gordon Dies at 96; Educator and Ambassador to
Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2009.

298. On March 27, 1964, Lincoln Gordon, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, confirmed to top
White House, State Department, and CIA officials that a "clandestine delivery of arms of nonUS origin [was made] . . . to Castello Branco supporters in Sao Paulo." Brazil Marks 40th
Anniversary ofMilitary Coup: DeclassifiedDocuments Shed Light on US Role, NAT'L SECURITY
ARCHIVE (2004), http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchivfNSAEBBINSAEBB 11 8/index.htm. Arms were
delivered by "unmarked submarine . . . at night in isolated shore spots . . . ." Id. CIA covert
operations sought to strengthen and fund "resistance forces ... for pro-democracy street rallies
. . . and encouragement [of] democratic and anti-communist sentiment." Id. They would be
requesting "supplemental funds for other covert action programs in the near future." Id. On
March 31, after being briefed on the operation to overthrow the Goulart "leftist government,"
Johnson responded: "I think we ought to take every step that we can, be prepared to do
everything that we need to do ..... Id. Secretary of State Dean Rusk telegrammed Gordon and
confirmed additional weapons and ammunition were being made available through a naval task
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Branco military dictatorship 299 and Brazil's debt mounted and became
unsustainable. TO
Later declassified White House documents chronicle U.S. involvement in bringing Ernesto Pinochet to power in Chile in 1973.301
National Security Council meeting notes, dated November 6, 1970,
document President Nixon, National Security Advisor Kissinger and
CIA Director Helms discussing proposals to overthrow President
Allende's government. 302 Initial proposals involved selling from the
U.S. "stockpile" of copper to plummet the world commodity market
price and "make the economy scream" because 80% of Chile's export
revenue came from mining copper. 303 Officials discussed the desire to
"do everything we can to hurt him and bring him down, but we must
retain an outward posture that is correct." 04 They recognized that
Allende was legitimately and popularly elected, but Kissinger stated: "I
don't see why we should let a country go Marxist because its people are
irresponsible."3 0 5 It is not clear that Chileans were toting and fervently
waving Soviet Union flags, and another interpretation is that the people
wanted control over their economy and greater economic equality and
perceived deep foreign involvement as undermining those goals.3 06
Congress recently blamed commercial bank lending for supporting
Pinochet's government by noting that "[h]istory has shown that
force, U.S. tankers, and an airlift off the coast of Brazil. Id. U.S. tankers "bearing POL" from
Aruba and an airlift provided "110 tons of ammunition" and mob control weapons. Id. The CIA
reported that "Joao Goulart, deposed president of Brazil, left ... for Montevideo." Id.
299. See generally Gary Duffy, Tackling Brazil's Painful Past, BBC NEWS, Nov. 26,
2007.
300. Miller, supra note 173, at 693-95; see generallysupra notes 145-46, 211, 220.
301. E.g., Navy Section, U.S. Military Group (Chile), Situation Report #2, Oct. 11, 1973,
availableat http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/ch21-01.htm.
302. Memorandum of a Conversation Regarding the Meeting in Chile (NSSM 97), White
House (Nov. 6, 1970) [hereinafter NSSM Memo], available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
news/20001113/701106. pdf. Regarding an assassination during a coup attempt in Chile during
1970, the court accepted Kissinger's respondeat superior defense, "[tihe Court finds that Dr.
Kissinger was acting within the scope of his employment as National Security Advisor to
President Nixon when he allegedly conspired to kidnap General Schneider. The establishment of
a Socialist government in Chile would have had a substantial impact on U.S. foreign policy."
Schneider v. Kissinger, 310 F. Supp. 2d 251, 265-66 (D.D.C. 2004), aff'd, 412 F.3d 190 (D.C.
Ctr. 2005). See also Harvey, supra note 101, at 26; GRANDIN, supra note 37, at 59 (citing Kory
Seeks to Testify at Sorenson Hearing,WASH. PosT, Jan. 10, 1977); THOMAS POWERS, THE MAN
WHO KEPT THE SECRETS: RICHARD HELMS AND THE CIA 230 (1979).

303. Nixon and Director of Emergency Preparedness George A. Lincoln discussed an
economic strangulation plan. NSSM Memo, supra note 302, at 3; John Radsan, An Overt Turn
on Covert Action, 53 ST. LouIs L.J. 485, 508 (2009).
304. NSSM Memo, supra note 302, at 2 (referencing Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird).
305.

GRANDIN, supra note 37, at 59-60; BELLO, supra note 110, at 16; POWERS, supra note

302, at 250.
306. See infra Part IV.C.3.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012

45

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 4

136

FLORIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 24

financing is key to terrorism, corruption, and other criminal acts"3 07 but
neglected to emphasize White House support and significant SOA
training for Pinochet's military.3 08 Chile's sovereign debt from private
sources amassed sevenfold between 1978 and 1982.'09
A March 1976 coup brought the military government to power in
Argentina and killed thousands between 1976 and 1983.310 U.S.
Department of State transcripts, dated two days before the coup, quote
officials discussing the financial assistance that had been arranged to
support the planned coup and make Argentina "governable."31 Two
months before the coup, the U.S. Ambassador met with the Argentinean
military officials and reported back to the Secretary of State to discuss
the concerns about the bad press for human rights abuses in Chile and
Uruguay.312 The U.S. media did later report about abuses perpetrated by
Argentina's new military regime, and in September 1978, the Carter
administration and Congress restricted aid to Argentina.3 13 Nonetheless,
the military regime received loans to purchase arms and corruptly
siphoned funds that exited the country in capital flight.3 14 In 1983, debt
owed to syndicates of U.S. and European commercial banks was $20.5
307. STAFF OF PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, MONEY LAUNDERING &
FOREIGN CORRUPTION OF THE S. COMM. ON Gov'T AFFAIRS, 108th Cong. Enforcement and
Effectiveness of the Patriot Act 9, 12, 17-20 (2004), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/
files/ACF5F8.pdf.
308. GILL, supra note 286, at 79 ("[M]ore Chilean soldiers trained at the SOA between
1970 and 1975 than from any other country during the entire decade.").
309. GRANDIN, supra note 37, at 171 ($2 billion (1978) to $14 billion (1982)).
310. MEMO REGARDING DISAPPEARANCE NUMBERS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Dec. 27, 1978,
available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB185/19781227%20Disappeara
nce%20Numbers%200000A8B l.pdf; Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky & Veerle Opgenhaffen, The Past
and Present of Corporate Complicity: Financingthe Argentinean Dictatorship,23 HARV. HUM.
RTs. J. 157, 185-86 (2010), http://harvardhrj.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/157-204.pdf.
311. William Rogers remarked to Kissinger that the success of the Argentine generals'
government will require "considerable effort to involve the United States -- particularly in the
financial field." Henry Kissinger, U.S. Sec'y of State, Transcript of Mar. 26, 1976 Staff
Meeting, NAT'L ARCHIVES 20, http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB185/
19760326%2oSecretaryO/o2OoP/o2oStet%2oKissingero/o2oChariman%20apgesl%201-39%20%20fIl.pdf. Kissinger responded: "Yes, but that's in our interest." Id. Rogers stated that six
months earlier, to support the military junta's efforts, they had "worked out as intermediaries a
sensible program for international assistance, using private banks and monetary institutions." Id.
The staff recognized that there would be "repression," but they saw the junta as a means to make
Argentina "governable." Id. at 20-21. Kissinger explained: "Whatever chance they have, they
will need a little encouragement from us." Id. at 21-22.
312. Memo from Ambassador Hill for ARA/Acting Assistant Secretary, Regarding
Military & Human Rights, U.S. Dep't of State (Feb. 16, 1976), available at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/SAEBBl 85/19760216%20Military/o20Take%20Cog
nizance%20of/o20Human%20Rights%20Issue%2000009FFO.pdf.
313. Bohoslavsky & Opgenhaffen, supra note 310, at 158, 193, 195-96.
314. Michalowski & Bohoslavsky, supra note 1, at 81; Bohoslavsky & Opgenhaffen,
supra note 310, at 187.
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billion, with an estimated $6.8 billion in U.S. public bonds. 3 15 Argentina
became one of the hardest debt-ridden countries. 3 16
There are examples outside of South America. As Filipino President
Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law, suspended elections and the
Constitution in 1972, stole billions in public funds and reigned over a
thirteen-year dictatorship, the U.S. military held bases in the country.3 17
A U.S Senate Committee on Foreign Relations investigation in 1972
summarized the Pentagon's reaction: "[M]ilitary bases and a familiar
government in the Philippines are more important than the preservation
of democratic institutions."318 Marcos was deposed in 1986, fled to
Clarke Air Force base, and the U.S. military provided safe passage to
Hawaii.3 19 In 1966, when Marcos came to power, the country held $1
billion in debt, but this grew to $25 billion over his twenty-year rule. 320
3. Economic Self-Determination
While most Cold War dictators are gone, many populations are still
burdened by odious debts and adverse lending consequences.321 For
example, in a recent Harvard Human Rights Journal article, Dr. Juan
Pablo Bohoslavsky and Veerle Opgenhaffen espouse corporate complicity in "financing the Argentinean dictatorship." 322 They emphasize the
"link between human rights violations and the profiteers of the system,"
but acknowledge doctrinal limitations and the difficulty in proving
causation and lender knowledge to establish liability. 323 Lenders often
profited from debt burdens imposed on populations 3 4 that would seem
to have limited means of preventing human rights and financial abuses
and dictatorship-governed countries. Yet, in some cases, financial,
diplomatic, and military assistance may have brought undemocratic
political leaders to power and even encouraged private sector lending
315. Bohoslavsky& Opgenhaffen, supra note 310, at 186.
316. See generally supra notes 155, 211, 215, 220.
317. Taking allegations as true only to sustain the motion to dismiss (not on the merits),
the court held that Marcos "under color of law ordered, orchestrated, directed, sanctioned and
tolerated the continuous and systemic violation of human rights of plaintiffs." In re Estate of
Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). JOHNSON, THE
SORROWS OF EMPIRE, supra note 99, at 209, 212; ALFRED W. Mccoy, A QUESTION OF TORTURE
U.S.
GLOBALIZATION,
PROMOTING POLYARCHY:
76 (2006); WILLIAM I. ROBINSON,
INTERVENTION, AND HEGEMONY 121 (1996).

318. ROBINsON, supra note 317, at 121; STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 93D
CONG., KOREA AND THE PHILPPINEs 45-46 (Comm. Print 1973).
319. JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE, supra note 99, at 212.

320.

Wyler, supra note 134, at 947.

321.

See STIGLITZ, supra note 37, at 237-41.

322.
323.
324.

Bohoslavsky & Opgenhaffen, supra note 310, at 157.
Id. at 166-71, 185.
Stark, supra note 181, at 17.
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while there was knowledge of abuses. Simplified justifications for
intervention based on threat allegations may in fact be more
interpretable, 325 and the dominate justification discourse may supplant
objective understandings of economic self-determination.
At one end of the spectrum are decades of CIA-dissembling to
foreign populations 326 and the domestic ideological cousin to those
threat portrayals, such as rhetoric dominant during the post-WWI "Red
Scare," post-WWII McCarthyism witch-hunts, Vietnam War crackdowns on dissenters, and Reagan-era communist bashing.327 Here, a
foreign country that asserts economic self-determination may have been
presumed to be bordering on communism even when this is not so
clear. 328 Compared to today, very different global circumstances
prevailed from the late-i 940s through the 1970s.
The U.N. system institutionalized peace initiatives, goodwill
relations, decolonization, and affirmed territorial and political sovereignty for populations formally under foreign control.32 9 Many
developing country political preferences and diplomatic collective
action movements exhibited wariness of unrestricted economic
globalization, which spawned competing perceptions of economic order
325. Details remained classified under "national security" as irreproachable actions to
fight communism. See generallysupra Parts IV.C. 1-2.
326. See generally ANGUS MACKENZIE, SECRETS: THE CIA'S WAR AT HOME (1999); HUGH
WILFORD, THE MIGHTY WURLITZER: How THE CIA PLAYED AMERICA (2008); Michael Warner,

Review of The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY (June 25, 2008), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-p
("[T]he
ublications/csi-studies/studies/vol52no2/intelligence-in-recent-public-literature-1.html
Central Intelligence Agency ran a world-wide covert action campaign to counter [ ] nonsense in
societies in which communism might take hold.").
327. Bejesky, Politico-International Law, supra note 37, at 42-43, 91-92; Bejesky,
Lessons Learned, supra note 46, at 370-72.
328. An alternative perception is offered by high-profile CIA whistleblower John
Stockwell who summarized his professional experience by saying that foreigners openly knew
that the CIA was "bribing people, corrupting people, and not protecting the U.S. in any visible
way." John Stockwell, The Secret Wars of the CIA (Oct. 1987), available at http://www.
informationclearinghouse.info/article4068.htm (explaining that while he was educated
throughout his life to be patriotic and oppose communists, he later believed that such sentiment
derived from exaggerations); Eyth, supra note 286, at 50 n.22 (2002) (noting Stockwell's high
profile whistleblower status). See generally JOHN STOCKWELL, IN SEARCH OF ENEMIES (1979).

Senator Eagleton sought to prohibit CIA covert operations under the War Powers Resolution
(1973) and urged Senators to "make the language of legislation match the realities of war ....
[W]ars do not always begin with the dispatch of troops. They begin with more subtle
investments . . . of dollars and advisors and civilian personnel." THOMAS F. EAGLETON, WAR
AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: A CHRONICLE OF CONGRESSIONAL SURRENDER 192-93 (1974); 119
CONG. REC. 25,079 (1973).

329. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law of
Armed Conflict by Non-State Actors, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 711, 745-49 (2008). See
generally DANIEL MORAN, WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION (2006).
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and disagreement over the extent that relations with dominant countries
were necessary for the most effective economic development. 33 0 This
ideology is inherent to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which was
founded on avoiding dominant power officiousness and eschewing both
the communist and Western/capitalist polarities during the Cold War.33 1
In 1962, General Assembly Resolution 1803 affirmed that sovereign
peoples have permanent dominion over their natural resources as a
fundamental right 332 to ensure that the "national community in which
the resources are found is to be a significant beneficiary of their
exploitation." 333 In 1974, 120 countries sought to push international law
into a direction that would reduce economic inequalities with the
General Assembly's Declaration on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order. 334
330. See generally Sylvester, supra note 10, at 273 (discussing nationalism and desire for
economic autonomy in former colonial countries). During the Cold War, even Western
European democracies followed more socialist trajectories in their advanced economies that
might have been unsettling to Americans. See generally SHERI BERMAN, THE PRIMACY OF
POLITICS: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE MAKING OF EUROPE'S TWENTIETH CENTURY (2006).

331. NAM began in 1955 as an international agreement among 29 mostly former colonies
that grew into an international organization with 118 (mostly) developing country members.
Profile: Non-Aligned Movement, BBC NEWS, Aug. 7, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/countryjprofiles/ 2798187.stm; The Non-Aligned Movement: Description and History,
NoN-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, http://www.nam.gov.za/background/history.htm

(last visited Feb.

13, 2012). NAM bylaws require that no member country can be a member of "a multilateral
military alliance concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts" and must adopt "an
independent policy based on the coexistence of States with different political and social
systems." Id. One of the chief founders of NAM was Indonesia, but in 1966, U.S. efforts were
behind the coup that brought Suharto to power and administrations supported his dictatorship
for three decades. JOHNSON, BLOWBACK, supra note 98, at 26, 74-77; JOHNSON, THE SORROWS

OF EMPIRE, supra note 99, at 69; CIA Stalling State Department Histories: State Historians
Conclude US PassedNames of Communists to IndonesianArmy, Which Killed at Least 105,000
in 1965-66, NAT'L SECURITY ARCHIVE (July 27, 2001), available at http://www.gwu.edu/

-nsaarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB52/; US Blocks Indonesia History Revelations, BBC NEWS, July
28, 2001; Isabel Hilton, OurBloody Coup in Indonesia, GUARDIAN, Aug. 1, 2001.
332. G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N. Doc. A/5217 (Dec. 14, 1962); Stephen M. Schwebel,
The Story of the U.N.'s Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 49
A.B.A. J. 463 (1963); Nico SCHRIJVER, SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES 311 (1997).

Without diversified economies or strong capital markets representing property rights, natural
resources were the developing world's critical asset. EDWARD B. BARBIER, NATURAL RESOURCES
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2007); Andrew van Hulten & Michael Webber, Do Developing

Countries Need 'Good' Institutions and Policies and Deep FinancialMarkets to Benefit from
CapitalAccount Liberalizations?,12 J.ECON. GEOGRAPHY 283, 283 (2012).
333. W. Michael Reisman, Harnessing International Law to Restrain and Recapture
Indigenous Spoliations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 56, 57 (1989); Antonio Cassese, The SelfDetermination of Peoples, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 92, 103 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981) (Article 1(2) "is not merely a

reaffirmation of the right of every state over its natural resources; it clearly provides that the
right over natural wealth belongs to peoples.").
334. G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/3201 (1974); S.K.
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Yet how to jurisprudentially view protectionist or nationalist
movements has been compounded by long-existing scholarly
disagreement over competing interpretations of sovereignty and selfdetermination, particularly over whether people, or the juridical entity
constitute a "state." 33 5 For example, Resolution 1803 depicted that
sovereign rights were vested in "citizens" and not "states" as a form of
human right. 36 However, defining the state as an actor that binds the
entity-state to international obligations begets incompatibilities in identifying whether political leader actions are legitimate vis-'r-vis the
domestic population3 3 7 when these leaders engage in contract and
property right transactions and exchanges with foreign interests. 338 The
populace-based view of self-determination, in the event of potential
violations of fiduciary relations between principal/populace and
agent/government, can conflict with presumptions of pacta sunt
servanda, the continuity of obligations, and the solidity of the state as
actor under international law. This discord contours the ODD debate.
And dominant state historical practice is probative to interpreting the
conflict.
D. Type Three and Customary Practice
1. Current Practice
Democratic turnover within substantially privatized, open-market

Agrawala, The EmergingInternationalEconomic Order, in THIRD WORLD ATTITUDES TOWARDS

INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 379-80 (Frederick E. Snyder & Surakiart Sathirathai
eds., 1987). Ironically enough, Resolution 3201 was followed by "loan pushing." See supra Part
III.B.
335. Lienau, supra note 1, at 64-65 ("the issue of sovereignty is notoriously slippery and
does not easily lend itself to concrete examination."); see generally JENS BARTELSON, A
GENEALOGY OF SOVEREIGNTY (1995); STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT (Thomas J.
Biersteker & Cynthia Weber eds., 1996).
336. Cassese, supra note 333, at 92, 102-03. See generally James Crawford, Some
Conclusions,in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES (James Crawford ed., 1988).

337.

Li-ann Thio, Battling Balkanization: Regional Approaches Toward Minority

Protection Beyond Europe, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 409, 463-64 (2002); Peter R. Baehr & Koo

VanderWal, IntroductionItem: Human Rights as Individual andas Collective Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS INA PLURALIST WORLD: INDIVIDUALS AND COLLECTIVITIES 35-36 (Jan Berting et al. eds.,

1990).
338.

See Gillian Triggs, The Rights of 'Peoples' and Individual Rights: Conflict or

Harmony?, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 141-44 (James Crawford ed., 1988); Emeka Duruigbo,

PermanentSovereignty and Peoples' Ownership of NaturalResources in InternationalLaw, 38
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 33, 73-74 (2006) (There are inconsistent interests between political
leaders and citizens, such as when natural resource sales are a source of government
corruption.). While not a physical resource property right, sovereign financial accounts represent
economic value.
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economies is today's norm.33 9 In the United States, Democrats and
Republicans haggled more intensely over societal affairs and the
appropriate level of government involvement in the economy in the
past, but today's consensus is support for privatized markets and
predictable business environments. 3 The U.S. foreign policy position
encourages globalization and adherence to international economic rights
and obligations, including for public debt.34 1 At the international level,
debt continuity, including after succession movements, generally
continued during the twentieth century. 342 Hence, continuity of financial
accounts appears like customar international law, 34 3 but case studies
provoke doctrinal controversy 34 and may support exceptions.
For example, in the case of state succession movements, diplomacy
over debt assumption unfolds progressively and only in the instance of
territorial unification has debt automatically passed to the new state.34 s
In other cases, the vexatious nature of state succession under
international law and concern for principles of eq.iity 346 may attenuate
proof of an "incontrovertible practice or custom." 7 Negotiation forums
that address state succession involve ad hoc policy interests, 348
339. John Williamson, Economics and Governance of the New Democracies, 22 PREs.
STUD. Q. 757 (1992).
supra note 37, at 69-71; see generally infra Part V.A.
340. Bejesky, Politico-International,
Western scholars, writing on the ODD, favored debt continuity from their own country's
interest. Alexander Sack apparently even evolved from overtly condemning continuity of odious
debt with the Bolshevik rise to power in Russia to a more pro-creditor position when appointed
as a law professor in the United States. Ludington & Gulati, supra note 40, at 615-21.
341. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 129, §§ 208, 209(2) (Even for succession, "[w]hen
a state succeeds another state with respect to particular territory, the capacities, rights, and duties
of the predecessor state with respect to that territory terminate and are assumed by the successor
state."); 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 234-36 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th
ed. 1992); Buchheit et al., supra note 1, at 1206; Williams & Harris, supra note 251, at 362;
Sarah Ludington et al., Money Matters, The Law, Economics, and Politics of Currency: Applied
Legal History: Demystiing the Doctrine of Odious Debts, 11 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 247, 250
(2010).
342. Ludington & Gulati, supra note 40, at 600. This trend is apt to continue. CHENG,
supra note 250, at 3 ("[T]he story of state succession and commercial obligations is a story
about globalization."). Globalization trends, U.S. power, European integration, the fall of the
Soviet Union, and economic integration agreements make pacta sunt servanda the
complementary doctrine to promote economic stability.
343. Williams & Harris, supra note 251, at 356.
344. Michalowski & Bohoslavsky, supra note 1, at 64.
345. King, supra note 1, at 613 (In other cases, debt passed "in equitable proportions.").
346. Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 9, in 2
THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: OFFICIAL PAPERS 1288

fj

4

(B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1997), reprintedin 31 I.L.M. 1523, 1524-25 (1992).
347.

STEVE TERRETT, THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE BADINTER ARBITRATION

COMMISSION 243 (2000).

348.

Myres S. McDougal et al., The World ConstitutiveProcess ofAuthoritative Decision,

19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 253 (1966-67).
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dominant power influences, and public and private sector actors
competing to continue advantageous obligations and terminate nonbeneficial ones.3 49 Likewise, the historical and current practice of
employing diplomacy to assess continuity of financial obligations
instead of firm rules necessarily places state succession and liability in a
state of flux. 350
In the case of government turnover and the presumption that the
state assumes predecessor government loan obligations, many factors
can be considered to support exceptions to what is ostensibly a
customary practice of debt continuity. A very high percentage of
developing countries have faced unsustainable financial obligations. 35 1
Intentional or neglectful "loan pushing" to political leaders who might
seek to retain power by appeasing disenfranchised populations, rising
oil market prices perhaps substantially due to U.S. consumption of onequarter of world's oil production, and escalating interest rates or adverse
currency exchange conditions with the U.S. dollar 352 are all factors that
might support fault-free exceptions to continuity of some percentage of
debt on general international law principles. For example, force majeure
provides that the "occurrence of an irresistible force or an unforeseen
event, beyond the control of state . . . [may make] it materially

impossible in the circumstances to perform the obligation."3 53 Necessity
can be an exception to fulfilling state obligations when it "is the only
way for the state to safepard an essential interest against a grave and
imminent peril . . . ."

4

For issues of voluntary debtor-populace

consent, annexing security threats with populations going "socialist"
may have involved foreign power meddling that may make it
unreasonable to pass external obligations to the populace.3 5 5
2. Historical Practice of Overtly Using Force to Enforce Property Rights
If unreasonable external pressure is a viable counterargument to the
presumption of a general or customary practice of debt assumption, then
349. CHENG, supra note 250, at 5, 65-71.
350. Reina, supra note 71, at 584-85; see generally supra Part IV.B; HERBERT JOLOWICZ,
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 128 (1952).

351. See generally supra Part 111.
352. See generallysupra Part III.B; Bejesky, Geopolitics, supra note 51, at 198-99.
353. Report of the International Law Commission (Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001),
U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, art. 23 (2001), http://www.un.org/
documents/ga/docs/56/ a5610.pdf.
354. Id. art. 25; G.A. Res. 56/843 (Dec. 12, 2001), http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/
56/a56843.pdf.
355. Id. (article I of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility affirms that "every
internationally wrongful act of a state entails the international responsibility of that state."); see
U.N. Doc. A/56/10, supra note 353, at 63; see generally supra PartsIV.C.2-3.
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even more distant history may be probative, either on principle or as
precursor influences on recent practice. The world has drastically
changed, but history is typically probative to finding customary
international law and general principles of law. 356 There have been
philosophical arguments for hundreds of years that debts of dictators
should be an exception to continuity of state obligations357 and it
remains a "persuasive concept" even without an international law
source that clearly supports an ODD.35 8 Moreover, as Professor Louis
Perez and Professor Deborah Weissman explain, ODD debates "are
themselves a product of the structural and historical convergence of
private economic power and political strategies." 359 Pre-U.N. history
offers some general themes that support this position and may even
garner perceptions of unclean hands. First, major powers treated foreign
lands as property rights 360 at a time when inhabitants lacked strong
government institutions and the means to avoid colonization under
circumstances when self-determination might have been favored.3 6 '
Second, conquest was considered a legitimate means of subjugation and
acquiring sovereign dominion over other territory.3 62 Third, "Victor's
Justice" often determined the status of a territory's existing financial
356.

OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 341, at 30 ("[U]sually a customary

international law is too slow a means of adapting to fast-changing circumstances."); W. Michael
Reisman, InternationalLawmaking: A Process of Communication, 75 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC.

101 (1981) (describing international law-making and establishing principles as a long and
interactive communication process).
357. Tai-Heng Cheng, Renegotiatingthe Odious Debt Doctrine,71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
7 (2007); J.G. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 274 (5th ed. 1963).

358. Ochoa, supra note 1, at 117, 123.
359. P6rez & Weissman, supra note 28, at 701; see generally Arewa, supra note 156, at
655-61. Informal mechanisms of economic control often remained after decolonization. NIALL
FERGUSON, EMPIRE: How BRITAIN MADE THE MODERN WORLD 235-45 (2003); Eric Kades,
Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1537 (1999); NIALL FERGUSON, A BRIGHT SHINING LIE 131

(1988); Ellen L. Frye, Private Military Firms in the New World Order: How Redefining
"Mercenary" Can Tame the "Dogs of War," 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2607, 2626-32 (2005) (citing
U.N. Resolutions during the 1960s and 1970s to criminalize colonial power use of mercenary
forces to maintain control over former colonies).
360. Territories and countries were treated as property rights by colonial powers and
sometimes thwarted self-determination movements. See generally T.R. DeGregori, Foreign

Investment and TechnologicalDiffusion: The Case of British ColonialAfrica, 2 J. EcON. ISSUES
403

(1968);

CHARLES

LipsoN,

STANDING

GUARD: PROTECTING FOREIGN CAPITAL IN THE

NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES 16-17 (1985); D.K. FIELDHOUSE, BLACK AFRICA 1945-

80: ECONOMIC DECOLONIALIZATION & ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT (1986); see KEITH, supra note

243.
361.

See generally UDAY SIGH MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE: A STUDY IN NINETEENTH-

CENTURY BRITISH LIBERAL THOUGHT (1999);

EDWARD W. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM

(1993); ASHIs NANDY, THE ILLEGITIMACY OF NATIONALISM: RABINDRANATH TAGORE AND THE

POLITICS OF SELF (1994); ARNOvE, supra note 286, at 108.
362. SHARON KORMAN, THE RIGHT OF CONQUEST 42-44 (1996).
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accounts when dominant powers engaged in conflict.3 63 Fourth,
dominant powers blatantly used force to collect financial debts from
weaker territories/countries.364 The following provides a few examples
drawn primarily from U.S. practice.
The American Revolution against the British Crown was a liberation
revolt that occurred partially due to dominant military power external yimposing financial obligations over the people in a foreign territory.
However, shortly after independence, U.S. officials engaged in a
somewhat similar practice of expanding the American borders by
purchasing and otherwise acquiring territory without regard to
inhabitant connections to that land. In the midst of the "Quasi-War"
with France, 366 the United States bought the land west of the Mississippi
for $15 million in the Louisiana Purchase (1803) and France relinquished territorial claims over a 220,000 square mile land mass even though
the French could not possibly have had satisfactory knowledge about
367
the land or the people who lived there. Sovereignty was extended and
the American government addressed Native American property right
that
claims for a century. 368 From the Mexican-American War, territory
369
became New Mexico, Arizona, and California was annexed. In 1867,
Alaska was purchased from Russia for $7.2 million in gold and the
363. See infra notes 365, 369, 372-77. From the Boer War (1899-1902), Britain refused to
honor debts of the Boer Republics. Ochoa, supra note 1, at 114. Britain acquired colonies from
Germany without regard to claims. ToM PARKER, CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN AND ASIAN STUDIES AT
NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, THE ULTIMATE INTERVENTION: REVITALISING THE UN
TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 7 (2003).
364. See infra notes 383-91.
365. BILL MARSHALL & CHRISTINA JOHNSTON, 3 FRANCE AND THE AMERICAS: CULTURE,
POLITICS, AND HISTORY 71 (2005).
366. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb
- A ConstitutionalHistory, 121 HARv. L. REV. 941, 967 (2008).
367. The Louisiana Purchase: Legislative Timetable - 1802 to 1807, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/louisianapurchase.html. France
controlled the enclave that became New Orleans. See generally JOHN SMITH KENDALL, HISTORY
OF NEW ORLEANS (1922). With the sale, legitimacy was created akin to today's purchasers for
value with no notice of defects.
368. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 28-29 (1831) (rejecting Cherokee
Nation claim and noting: "In the exercise of sovereign right, the sovereign is sole arbiter of his
own justice. The penalty of wrong is war and subjugation."); Johnson v. Graham's Lessee v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 543, 588 (1923) ("Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the
conqueror cannot deny."); Barron & Lederman, supra note 366, at 981, 991 (discussing
legislation to raise military forces to contain and issue deployments to fight Native American
tribes); Indian Land Cessations in the United States, 1774-1894, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, (U.S.
Ser. Set, No. 4015), available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwss-ilc.html; see
generally U.S. INDIAN CLAIMS COMM'N, AUG. 13, 1946 - SEPT. 30, 1978: FINAL REPORT 23-125
(U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 1979).
369. See Note, Congress, the President,and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81
HARv. L. REV. 1771, 1780 (1968).
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Treaty permitted "inhabitants" to choose to "return to Russia within
three years" or become U.S. citizens, while the "uncivilized native
tribes . . . will be subject to such laws and regulations as the United

States may, from time to time, adopt in regard to aboriginal rights."3 70
In external relations, maintaining debts over territories at the
cessation of hostilities has a history in international law when
continuing obligations were beneficial to victors and debts were
extinguished when they would encumber the victor. 37 1 For example, the
United States refused to pay claims on the territory of Texas after
Mexico was defeated in the Mexican-American War and Texas
officially became an American state. 3 72 Likewise, when Spain ceded
sovereignty over Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines following the
Spanish-American War of 1898,373 Spain wanted the United States to
assume the debts of the territories since they were obligations
"contracted exclusively for their regime and government."3
The
United States retorted that the territories should not be obligated to
repay debt because Spain had imposed the loans on the people and
employed financial relations to suppress the Fopulation. 375 This early
ODD proclamation may have been merited, 3 6 or derived from selfinterest. 377 Cuba became a U.S. protectorate, the Platt Amendment in
1901 provided U.S. veto power over Cuban foreign policy, the U.S.
370. Treaty Concerning the Cession of the Russian Possession in North America, U.S.Russia, arts. 1, 6, Mar. 30, 1867, reprintedin A CENTURY OF LAWMAKING FOR A NEW NATION:
U.S. CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS AND DEBATES, 1774-1875, at 542-43, available at

http://library.state.ak.us/hist/fulltext/ASL-KF50.U58v15-p539.htm.
371. The principle of maintaining credits and debts at the cessation of hostilities has been
recognized in international law, U.S. courts, in practice, and commentary. See generally ERNST
FEILCHENFELD, PUBLIC DEBTS AND STATE SUCCESSION (1931); Buchheit et al., supra note 1, at

1204-10; Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 112 (1814); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 199, 255 (1796); John Dickinson, Enemy Owned Property:Restitution or Confiscation,
22 FOREIGN AFF. 126, 141 (1943); COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, THE EFFECT OF WAR ON CONTRACTS

45 (1909).
372. Feibelman, supra note 1, at 739.
373. Buchheit et al., supra note 1, at 1214; Wyler, supra note 134, at 959.
374. Cuba was recognized as part of Spain in the 1876 Spanish Constitution and was
governed by Spanish law. RAYMOND CARR, SPAIN 1808-1930, at 375-83 (1966); M.H. Hoeflich,
Through a Glass Darkly: Reflections upon the History of the InternationalLaw of Public Debt
in Connection with States Succession, 1982 ILL. L. REv. 39, 52-53 (1982) (Spain argued at the
peace negotiations in Paris that it would be "contrary to the most elemental notions ofjustice . . .
to lose all . . . rights over a territory" and then still be responsible for the obligations.).
375. Buchheit et al., supra note 1, at 1214-15; Ludington et al., supra note 341, at 250-58;
1 John Bassett Moore, Digest of InternationalLaw, H.R. Doc. No. 551-23, at 352-85 (1906);
Ludington & Gulati, supra note 40, at 629.
376. See Wyler, supra note 134, at 950; Lienau, supra note 1, at 65.
377. Pdrez & Weissman, supra note 28, at 719 ("U.S. repudiation of the Cuban debt has
less to do with the circumstances of the Cuban insurrection (1895-1898) than with the logic of
the victor imposing the terms of peace on the vanquished.").
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government supported the Gerardo Machado dictatorship during the
1920s and 1930s and other pro-U.S. regimes, 3 78 and the United States
still maintains the Guantanamo Bay military base even though a
communist government has ruled since 1959.379
The practice of colonialism and using force over weaker countries/
territories was used to continue financial obligations and relations. The
European colonial powers convened the Conference of Berlin in 188485 to create the African colonies, which has been labeled the "biggest
Monopoly game in history." 380 There was extensive colonialism and
foreign influence in Latin America381 and the British carved territorial
divisions in the Middle East and empowered monarchies in countries
382
Until the early 20th century, dominant
that remain undemocratic.
powers customarily employed force and other coercive means to thwart
self-determination movements of populations that sought to repudiate
debts of previous regimes. Britain countered revolts against debt
repudiation by attacking Mexico (1861), Egypt (1882), Greece (1887),
Venezuela (1902), Serbia (1904), and Guatemala (1913).383 Economics
Professor Kris Mitchener and Economics Professor Marc Weidenmier
note that "all nations that defaulted on sovereign debt ran the risk of
gunboats blockading their ports or creditor nations seizing fiscal control
of their country . . . ."384 In about a third of other cases from 1870-1913,
debtor countries faced "supersanctions" or direct military, financial and
political pressure.3 85
The practice of using military force to collect debts was so
predominant and obvious that the Hague Convention Respecting the
Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract
Debts (1907) was adopted to end "Gunboat Diplomacy."3 86 With this
378. Id. at 715-17. The U.S. military faced revolt when it sought to exercise control over
the Philippines. See generally HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 306
(1980); JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE, supra note 99, at 29, 39-46.

379.

Sean Foley, The Iraq Status-of-Forces Agreement, Iran, and Guantanamo Bay, 34

RUTGERS L. REc. 39, 45 (2009).

380. Arewa, supra note 156, at 657; see generally MAKONNEN, supra note 282.
381. See generally infra notes 388-94.
382. See generally Thomas L. Friedman, The First Law of Petropolitics, FOREIGN POL'Y
28, 36 (2006); Bejesky, Geopolitics, supranote 51, at 11-19.
383. King, supra note 1, at 618; Lee C. Buchheit, The Role of the Official Sector in
Sovereign Debt Workouts, 6 CHm. J. INT'L L. 333, 335-36 (2005); LIPSON, supra note 360, at 53-

54.
384. King, supra note 1, at 618 (quoting Kris J. Mitchener & Mark D. Weidenmier,
Supersanctions and Sovereign Debt Repayment (NBER Working Paper No. 11472, 2005),
availableat http://www.nber.org/papers/wl 1472.
385. Id. at 617.
386. Hague Convention (II) Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the
Recovery of Contract Debts, Oct. 18 1907, 36 Stat. 2241, 1 Bevans 607; Perez, supra note 174,
at 56.
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initiative to foster comity, stability, and cooperation, American foreign
policy began to stigmatize governments in economic relations,
exhibited some penchant for commoditization and securitization of
foreign assets, 8 provided financial and military support for pro-U.S.
governments, and engaged in more direct actions of militarilyoccupying and monitoring elections in foreign countries to ensure a
preferred result.3 8 9 In 1933, U.S. Major General Smedley Butler wrote
of the American military's role:
I spent thirty-three years and four months in active military
service . . . . I served in all commissioned ranks from Second

Lieutenant to Major-General. And during that period, I spent
most of my time being a high class muscle-man for Big Business,
for Wall Street and for the Bankers. In short, I was a racketeer, a
gangster for capitalism. I suspected I was just part of a racket at
the time. Now I am sure of it. Like all members of the military
profession, I never had a thought of my own until I left the
service. My mental faculties remained in suspended animation
while I obeyed the orders of higher-ups. This is typical with
387. P6rez & Weissman, supra note 28, at 731 (illustrating that the United States has long
used economic sanctions to restrict foreign policy, including via the Trading with the Enemy
Act (1917), the Hickenlooper Amendment (1976), and the Helm's Burton Act (1996)); Id. at
732 (The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (1977) criminalized lending to a country in default on
payment of a debt to the United States.); see Parts IV.C.2-3.
388. Private banks sometimes provided loans to developing countries with "controlled"
terms that were negotiated with U.S. government officials, backed by the leverage of the state,
and permitted oversight of the borrowing state's economy. Perez & Weissman, supra note 28, at
701-02, 707-08. Wall Street banking interest and State Department concern were connected, and
loans were perceived as a mechanism for expanding the economy and accessing cheap and
abundant foreign raw materials. In June 1921 J.P. Morgan promised that loans to foreign
governments would first be submitted to the State Department. Id. at 714-15. In the Dominican
Republic, the New York-based San Domingo Improvement Company (SDIC) purchased the
debt that was amassed (partially for private use) of U.S.-allied Ulises Heureaux dictatorship. Id.
at 710-11. U.S. government officials knew of and tolerated Heureaux's abuses and corruption,
SDIC profited, and the United States extended control over the Dominican Republic's finances.
Id. After "Heureaux was overthrown and" the country was left virtually insolvent, "[s]uccessive
governments sought to" repudiate the debts and SDIC's leverage over the economy, but the U.S.
government refused, sent marines to occupy the country, prevented insurrections, and installed
the Rafael Trujillo dictatorship. Id. at 711-13.
389. Nicaragua, Guatemala and Chile were just three dictatorships sponsored by the
United States seemingly for economic interests. Id. at 719-20; LIPsON, supra note 360, at 54, 7475 (explaining that imperial powers obtained greater investment security by advocating the "rule
of law" and property rights, including at the colonial-power governed League of Nations);
Stephen E. Gottlieb, In the Name of Patriotism:The Constitutionalityof "Bending" History in
Public Secondary Schools, 62 N.Y.U.L. REv. 497, 509 (1987) (stating that "economic history"
and "the power of American multinational corporations goes unacknowledged" in American
public school textbooks).
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everyone in the military service. I helped make Mexico,
especially Tampico, safe for American oil interests in 1914. I
helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City
Bank boys to collect revenues in. I helped in the raping of half a
dozen Central American republics for the benefits of Wall Street.
The record of racketeering is long. I helped purify Nicaragua for
the international banking house of Brown Brothers in 1909-1912
. . . . I brought down the Dominican Republic for American sugar

interests in 1916. In China I helped to see to it that Standard Oil
went its way unmolested.3 90
The U.S. Marine Corps drafted a Small Wars Manual to address
"military interventions in Latin America from 1898 to 1934" and
provide guidance to "suppress insurrection using a range of military
options" including by "'establishment of a complete military
government supported by an active combat force."' 3 91 With the
intention of quelling complaints from inhabitants of Central and South
America and the Caribbean, Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor"
policy in 1933 announced the need to respect "absolute sovereignty of
individual nations," renounce the "right to engage in unilateral
interventions," and "make concessions to economic nationalists." 392
FDR's inaugural address promised:
I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor
...

who . . . respects the rights of others . . . and respects the

sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors . . . .
[W]e now realize as we have never realized before . . . that we

cannot merely take but we must give as well.3 93
Professor Grandin explains the address from the context of
diplomacy at the Sixth Pan-American Conference (1928):
[The] idea that the American republics shared common ideals and
390. Pdrez & Weissman, supra note 28, at 699. While officially condemned, such use of
military force may have evolved from the early practice enumerated in Article I, § 8 of the U.S.
Constitution, which refers to Congress's authority to "grant letters of marque and reprisal." U.S.
CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8-9. It was a means of authorizing private citizens to make war against
another country or people. THEODORE D. WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw 209 (5th ed. 1878).
391. Nathan A. Canestaro, "Small Wars" and the Law: Options for Prosecuting the
Insurgents in Iraq, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73, 79 (2004) (citing U.S. MARINE CORPS,
SMALL WARS MANUAL 1-l(b) (1940)).
392. GRANDIN, supra note 37, at 3.
393. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th-century/froosl.asp.
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political interests, was in effect moribund. But it was trotted out
every few years in an international forum where Latin American
delegates mostly submitted to Washington's directives while
silently seething about the latest violation of sovereignty-in
Panama, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Mexico, Venezuela, Honduras, the
Dominican Republic, Haiti, take your pick. 3 94
3. Concluding Points
U.N. rules affirm sovereignty and self-determination, but the history
of dominant powers maintaining economic obligations over foreign
populations may be relevant to explaining why countries sometimes
exhibited extreme opposition to foreign economic interests, NAM
emerged, and U.N. General Assembly Resolutions were adopted and
grounded on conjoining principles of self-determination, property
rights, and decolonization. 5 Yet the simplistic view of opposition to
deeper capitalist relations amid claims of unfairness may be that such a
rejection was of international law regarding states' rights and
obligations. Recalcitrant states were sometimes treated as security
threats, while the Soviet Union exploited sympathies and considered
capitalist expansionism oppressive. Using the premises developed in
Parts III and IV, Part V explains why concerns for voluntary consent,
defects in principal/agent relations, external influences, selfdetermination, and international law may provide exceptions both to the
initial borrowing obligation and to the continuity of mounting debt.
V. A COMMON LAW AND EQUITY ODD
A. Competing Principlesand Core ODD Elements
A preliminary concern in recognizing a sovereign ODD in common
law and equity is to ensure that desirables are not pitted against each
other. Value-endowing and performing loans are provided within a
decentralized system of economic decision-making that quantifies
risk/reward payoffs, forms competitive markets, 39 and establishes
394.

GRANDIN, supra note 37, at 32; JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE, supra note 99, at

192; Ernesto Hernandez-Lopez, Guantanamoas a "Legal Black Hole": A Base for Expanding
Space, Markets, and Culture, 45 U.S.F. L. REv. 141, 161 (2010) ("Before the Cold War, U.S.
foreign relations with Latin America included legal mechanisms such as military interventions,
occupation, protectorates, fomenting secession, and forced treaties under the international law
guise of the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary.").
395. See generallysupra notes IV.C-D.
396.

MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 4 (1962); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE
23-36 (1962); ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY:

ROAD TO SERFDOM
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global efficiencies and predictability. Benefits of globalization 39 7 should
not be endangered by a new lending risk398 that attenuates the contractual trust necessary in international commercial relations for diverse
actors. 399 Creditors have long had to implicitly assess risk of sovereign
nonpayment due to political upheaval, but they have not had to partake
in due diligence risk assessments that incorporate more profound risks
relating to whether sovereign borrowers were internally "legitimate"400
or acting consistently with populace will. 40 1 Without appropriate
standards, a worst-case scenario is that "selective" debt renouncement 402
could sire encompassing ODD applications that permit successor
governments to liberally repudiate obligations from contracts that
extended value to the population. New credit risks could reverberate
beyond legitimately-aggrieved and similarly-situated countries 403 to
form a destabilizing impact on global commerce.4 0 4
Alternatively, numerous developing countries suffered with debt
accumulation and weakened economies, while the prescribed austerity
and privatization remedies were often controversial and bred limited

REINTERPRETING THE VALUES OF LAW AND EcoNOMics (2000) (Combinations of creativity and

efficiency can generate wealth and growth.).
397. Globalization can permit technology transfer, narrow the knowledge gap, yield more
efficient resource use and increase productivity. Stiglitz, supra note 22, at 453; Kevin C.
Kennedy, A WTO Agreement on Investment: A Solution in Search of a Problem?, 24 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 77, 144-46 (2003); Carla Davidovich, The Selling of Argentina: Is The Path to
the First World Privatized?, 28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 154, 163-70 (1996). Globalization
may lead to infrastructure, telecommunication, transportation, and energy sector improvements.
Matias F. Travieso-Diaz & Alejandro Ferrate, Recommended Features of Foreign Investment
Code for Cuba's Free Market Transition, 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 511, 533 (1995).
Criticism of MNCs is sometimes warranted. Stiglitz, supra note 22, at 474 (emphasizing
multinational responsibility and noting that "MNCs have been vilified-and often for good
reason").
398. Political and economic system trust may help produce a fruitful macroeconomic
environment that avoids large-scale cost shifting onto society, loss transfer to the tax base,
inefficient capital allocation, and heightened lending risk. Corporate, contract, property and
lending laws increase predictability and remedy transgressions.
399. Tarullo, supra note 142, at 287. The necessity of contractual trust intensifies with
globalization. CHENG, supra note 250, at 8-9, 382.
400. Lienau, supranote 1, at 102.
401. Buchheit et al., supra note 1, at 1226; Ochoa, supra note 1, at 156-57.
402. Perez & Weissman, supra note 28, at 734.
403. Gelpem, supra note 1,at 407.
404. Mark Medish, Op-Ed., Make Baghdad Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2003, at 25;
Raghuram Rajan, Odious or Just Malodorous: Why the Odious Debt Proposalis Likely to Stay
in Cold Storage, FIN. & DEV., Dec. 2004, at 54-55, available at http://www.imf.org/
extemal/pubs/ft/fandd/2004/12/pdf/straight.pdf; Lienau, supra note 1, at 94 (stating that an
ODD may moor a slippery slope of risk that halts sovereign lending). Lenders might insert
contractual provisions that attempt to prevent repudiation of odious debt and make interests
paramount to other lenders. Feibelman, supra note 1, at 727.
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405

results to alleviate the original problem. To the extent that external
obliations lock generations of people into cycles of economic failure, 6 prosperous international relations are not being achieved and
resultant hardship is inconsistent with foundational international law
principles. For example, Article 55 of the U.N. Charter seeks to promote
conditions of economic and social well-being, "higher standards of
living," and "solutions of international economic problems" that are
"necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations, based on
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples."40 7 An ODD framework may be a means of making international economic relations more consistent with this foundational
principle, fulfilling moral imperatives, and promoting human rights.4 0 8
Reasonable interpretation of elements in an ODD test can address
these policy concerns and prevent scenarios in which droves of creditors
with unfairly repudiated debts must demand repayment in various legal
forums.409 Existing ODD formulations generally agree on core elements, such as disfavoring loans that were made for "purposes that do
not further the needs or interests of the state" and that the populace did
not consent to. 4 10 These elements are consistent with widely-accepted
contract law doctrines in which a breach of the principal/agent
relationship or contract defects may vitiate a contract or excuse
405. See generally supra Part III.
406. Soren Abrose, Social Movements and the Politics of Debt Cancellation, 6 CHi. J.
INT'L L. 267 (2005); Mugasha, supra note 68, at 878-79; Lothian, supra note 245, at 438-39.
407. U.N. Charter art. 55; see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights pmbl. G.A.
Res. 217 (1II)(A), P 1 (Dec. 10, 1948) (similar language); International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316, art. 1 (Dec. 16, 1966); World
Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declarationand ProgrammeofAction,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993), http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/
(symbol)/1 .conf. 157.23.en (General Assembly advocacy for debt relief premised on similar
principles).
408. See generally Parts II.B-C; Ochoa, supra note 1, at 119, 124 ([A]lternatively,
shunning countries from credit markets could cause dictators to attain revenues by means that
might further harm the population, economic resources, or the environment.); Boon, supranote
61, at 1012-13 (illustrating that oil interests undergirded the 1956 Suez crisis, the 1990 Kuwait
crisis, and intervention in Sudan and Iraq; mining sector abuse and corruption played a role in
the 1998-2003 wars in the Congo, and diamond and timber exploitation and corruption funded
and perpetuated conflict in Liberia.); Duruigbo, supra note 338, at 33 (discussing "resource
curse" and "leadership curse").
409. While domestic courts may be the natural recourse to address repudiated odious
debts, an alternative to domestic jurisdiction is to constitute an international tribunal.
Jayachandran & Kremer, supra note 35, at 90. Likewise, an international institution could (1) ex
ante label governments and (2) expost resolve disputes. Wyler, supra note 134, at 953.
410. Ochoa, supra note 1, at 116-17; Sylvester, supra note 10, at 319 ("[F]or reasons
including, but not limited to, government incompetence and corruption, it is simply absurd to
conclude that the suffering masses in sub-Saharan Africa 'assumed the risk' of lending
agreements.).
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performance. 4 1 1 Likewise, if value was extended to the population, then
principles of equity would favor enforcement. 4 12
Alexander Sack's ODD language also articulated a "despotic power"
and some degree of creditor knowledge that "loans would be used for
purposes contrary to the interests of the nation." 413 These inquiries
might best be viewed as fact-intensive subsidiary concerns to core
elements, particularly because of evolving international economic
relations and institutions and technology changes. For example, creditor
knowledge of an odious agent with globalized media societies boosts
the likelihood of actual or constructive notice 4 14 that funds are less apt
411. Sylvester, supra note 10, at 261, 295-99 ([D]ebt relief via contract law principles is
"consistent with certain well established principles of United States contract law."). Contract
defenses may shift responsibility, if not a literal burden of proof, unto the creditor for
misbehavior. A sovereign might repudiate odious debt in court by claiming loans were
inequitable, immoral, illegal, or antithetical to public policy; involved lender unclean hands; and
violated agency law principles and fiduciary responsibilities to the populace/principal or should
"pierce the corporate veil." Buchheit et al., supra note 1, at 1234-47. Doctrines of
unconscionability and impracticability might alleviate debt. Sylvester, supra note 10, at 300-03,
307-10; Lothian, supra note 245, at 460-61. A survey of case law and doctrines in "France,
Belgium, Italy, Germany, the United States, England, Spain, and Argentina," reveals a "general
theory of the responsibility for abusive granting of credit." Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky,
Responsibility for Abusive Granting of Sovereign Loans, 14 LAW & Bus. REV. AM. 495, 495,
501-02 (2008). Many creditor countries incorporate these doctrines into their commercial codes.
Widespread acceptance of contract law defenses in market economies could be the basis for
customary practice. Violating those principles on specific agreements and then imposing
obligations could be construed to violate a population's right of self-determination and
voluntary assent. Jus cogens are norms "accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted . . . ." Vienna
Convention, supra note 242, art. 53. Jus cogens norms might be violated if loans were executed
in violation of fundamental human rights. Michalowski & Bohoslavsky, supra note 1, at 65-70.
412. 1 DANIEL P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 381 (2d ed. 1970) ("The formal
contractual relationship may have expired but the equity has not."); Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli
ac Pacis Libri Tres, reprinted in 2 THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 314-15, 319 (James
Brown Scott ed., Francis W. Kesley trans., 1964) (illustrating that imposing public debt liability
on future generations may be reasonable when a benefit of credit was extended to predecessors).
413. Ochoa, supra note 1, at 116-17; Wyler, supra note 134, at 967-68 (Referencing
Sack's test and noting that "[i]f a democratically elected regime, for example, contracted a debt
for some detestable purpose, it could not be deemed odious since it was not incurred by a
despot."); Jeff King, The Odious Debt Doctrine in International Law: Definition and Evidence,
in Ashfaq Khalfan et al., Advancing The Odious Debt Doctrine 13-52 (CISDL Working Paper
No. COM/RES/ESJ, 2003), available at http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/publications/
Advancingthe Odious Debt Doctrine.pdf (providing a three element ODD definition that
strips the "despotic power" element-(1) a debt was incurred without populace consent, (2)
credit extended did not benefit the population, and (3) the creditor had knowledge of the first
two elements and unpalatable circumstances).
414. Lenders might have exhibited heightened awareness when it is evident that money
was lent to suppress the population or enrich the personal fortunes of corrupt rulers. See
generally Anderson, supra note 39, at 408; Ordu, supra note 7, at 236. Creditors might have
constructive notice that lending would be used to facilitate or carry out a war. D.P. O'CONNELL,
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to be used for the needs of the state and that the populace could not
consent to prudent fiscal decision-making. 4 15 Defects in the loan
contract may be more probable as the level of despotism increases.
Also, there are many pertinent and related factual considerations that are
not clearly defined within historical ODD definitions.
Previously discussed examples of dominant-state foreign relations
with questionable developing world leaders maj undermine the
likelihood that there was popular consent to loans. 16 Overlending at
high interest rates and accumulated debt might also create constructive
notice that obligations could not reasonably have been expected to be
repaid by the population. Degenerating macroeconomic conditions
could have escalated into circumstances tantamount to usury interest,
and unfair profiteering.4 1 7 If creditors reaped high profits in the early
years, the equity of enforcing unsustainable accumulated obligations
should decrease. U.S. government policies during the 1970s urged
THE LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION 189 (1956). Lending utility depends on perceived legitimacy of

the confrontation. King, supra note 1, at 650. Some war debts have been more acceptable, such
as the U.S. government issuing war bonds during World War II. Alternatively, the Vietnam War
commenced with the contrived Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Lori Fisler Damrosch, Comment:
War and Uncertainty, 114 YALE L.J. 1405,

1409 (2005); JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND

RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 19 (1993). The

North Vietnamese did not threaten the American people and the war was presented with a $10
billion cost estimate that morphed into $110-150 billion of spending. ARTHUR OKUN, THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PROSPERITY, ch. 3 (1970). This spending purportedly caused Nixon's

breach on the Gold Standard. See generally supra text accompanying notes 99-101. For the
2003 invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration consistently represented a severe WMD security
threat (that was false) and avoided discussions of occupation and cost to taxpayers. See
generally Bejesky, Politico-InternationalLaw, supra note 37, at 56-63; see generally STIGLITZ
& BILMES, supra note 37 (describing mounting costs and derivative economic losses). By
comparison, right-wing interests may perceive Franklin D. Roosevelt's massive New Deal
spending to alleviate the Great Depression during the 1930s as excessive. JOHN STEELE
GORDON, HAMILTON'S BLESSING 122-24 (1997); Tiefer, supra note 37, at 239.

415. Potential to violate legitimate populace consent is apt to be highest during the time a
dictator reigns, making it unreasonable to presume that the population can adequately assent to
external obligations. When dictators are deposed and there is a gradually improving populace
check over political leaders with democratization processes, the level of implied populace
consent will presumably grow.
416. See supra Part IV.C; David Gray, Devilry, Complicity and Greed: Transitional
Justice and Odious Debt, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137 (2007) (contending that countries

emerging from odious debts should not only be relieved from repayment obligations, but banks,
businesses, and countries that knowingly extended credit or invested in an abusive regime
should be required to provide restitution to the abused citizenry). This could implicate liability
onto the Reagan-Bush Sr. administrations for militarily and financially supporting Hussein's
regime. Irene Gendzier, Does Knowing Matter? U.S. CongressionalRecords and the Arming of
Iraq, 4 UNBOUND 96, 96, 99-105 (2008); Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, Patriotism,
Nationalism and the War on Terror: A Mild Plea in Avoidance, 56 FLA. L. REv. 933, 976-77
(2004).
417. See supra Parts III.B-C (discussing the poor 1980s and 1990s growth rates).
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lending to stimulate the U.S. economy and U.S. tax rules and deposit
insurance might have decreased risk of loss assessments, all of which
presumably would not dissuade the purported "loan pushing." 4 18 With
such facts, treating debt as odious seems less controversial from the
standpoint of requiring a creditor to reasonably assume the risk of
nonpayment, due to harm that lending could cause, and because such
loans did not provide value that fulfills benefits of globalization.
B. Repudiation and Lack of Consent
An important consideration is whether a population consented to or
otherwise ratified obligations deriving from the original loan as debt
mounted. The definition of customary international law, "a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation,"4 19 is useful in assessing this point. Did highly-indebted
countries willingly assume questionable debt out of a sense of "legal
obli ation" or did more economically-powerful creditor nations require
it? 42 Would portions of aggregating debt have been renounced as
odious, but for international community pressure to maintain the status
421
or perceptions that repudiation
quo, risk of debtor-state isolation,
would be futile? If so, circumstances may not be a legitimate basis for
establishing voluntary customary practice. 422 Moreover, it is possible
that more precedent of unequivocal repudiation of questionable public
debt did not arise due to the difficulty of noticing the loss spread out
across the tax base,42 3 ability to shroud details of public accounts,
gradual democratic transitions, and adherence to comity. Nonetheless,
418,

See supra Part III.B.

419,

RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 129,

§ 102(2).

420. For example, the U.S. government has massive power asymmetries and bureaucratic
staff to push preferred policies on weaker developing countries and their staff. Stiglitz, supra
note 22, at 479-80. Some rule frameworks ostensibly institutionalize dominant state pressure.
Article 41 of the 1983 Vienna Convention requires agreement on debt allocation as a
precondition to international community recognition. See generally supra note 266. U.S. laws
can impose penalties. Pdrez & Weissman, supra note 28, at 732 (stating that the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (1977) criminalizes lending to a country in default on payment of a debt to the
United States). States may be reluctant to repudiate potentially-odious debt if punishment risk is
perceived.
421. Wyler, supra note 134, at 969; see generally supra notes 268-71; see supra Parts
III.C.2 & III.D for impositions relating to currency cooperation and debt restructuring.
422. Lothian, supra note 245, at 460-61; Sylvester, supra note 10, at 296-97; Lothian,
supra note 224, at 460-61; see supra Part V.B for instances of pressure.
423. Informed corporate shareholders will notice financial surpluses and losses, but
sovereign accounts with questionable debt lending as a portion of aggregate accounts may not
be noticed. Losses are disbursed across the tax base and aggregate with other accounting entries.
ODD questions are flagged when public debt accounts mount and effects are profoundly felt,
which may mean that agents violated public trust or were not conscientious.
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there is evidence that states objected to debt continuity.
Pre-U.N., Cold War, and decolonization movements provide many
During the
unequivocal diplomatic assertions of debt repudiation.
1980s, many large-scale populace movements in Latin America sought
to reject onerous debt and austerity programs. 425 In some cases, when
developing countries attempted to repudiate debt, that position was
retorted by pressure from creditor states to maintain obligations. 426
When negotiations unfolded to reconcile those differences, there was
debt restructuring and rescheduling, which by altering the terms could
be viewed as dozens of recent cases of varying degrees of debt
repudiation. 427 Additionally, agreements to modify obligations may
even be another reason for not encountering more cases of unequivocal
repudiation of questionable debt. Multiple refinancing not only
postpones obligations, often as a perceived favor to the debtor, but also
potentially reaffirms debt as legitimate and obfuscates the original terms
of loans as debt aggregates.4 In other cases, creditor states reduced
debt on countries such as Poland, Egypt, Yugoslavia, Pakistan, and Iraq
as "write-off' percentages that were unrelated to "need," but annexed
424. See supra Part IV.C; Ordu, supra note 7, at 252-53. Examples include Mexico
(1867), Cuba (1898), Russia (1918), and Poland (1919). See generally supra text accompanying
note 385.
425. Santos, supra note 81, at 68-70, 110.
426. In the early-1980s, Nicaraguan President Ortega sought to repudiate the U.S.supported Somoza dictator's debt at a U.N. address, but was advised that doing so might
alienate Nicaragua from Western countries. Wyler, supra note 134, at 968-69; Lothian, supra
note 245, at 434-36 (discussing Peru's unequivocal repudiation). In the late-1980s,
democratically-elected Filipino President Corazon Aquino was thwarted from repudiating debts
of the Ferdinand Marcos dictatorship. Buchheit et al., supra note 1, at 1206. Western creditor
states "made joint and several liability a pre-condition to the twelve [Soviet] republics receiving
financial assistance from the Western states." Wyler, supra note 134, at 970. Soviet Union
financial obligations were quickly resolved "in the interest of any potential recognition of their
independence and future loans and assistance." Id.; see generally supra notes 155, 215
(discussing Argentina). In the early-1980s, a consortium of banks sued Costa Rica in U.S.
federal court for being delinquent on debt repayment, but the case never reached the merits. The
U.S. government became intimately involved in negotiations to reschedule the debt. P6rez &
Weissman, supra note 28, at 741-45.
427. Michalowski & Bohoslavsky, supra note 1, at 106 (illustrating "restructuring" debt
may be a hybrid form of repudiation); MacCallum, supra note 142, at 426 (stating that even
during the quarter-century prior to 1982, "eighty debt relief agreements were executed");
Sanford, supra note 40, at 358, 360; Buchheit & Reisner, supra note 268, at 493 ("[H]undreds
or thousands of credits that purport to be covered by a restructuring request [ ] have been
separately negotiated between borrowers . .. and individual banks. . . .").
428. See generally supra notes 108-11. Refinancing may diversify risk on amassing debt,
debt-to-equity processes and privatizations all may alleviate debt obligations and may bypass
questions of the legitimacy of the original debt. See supra Parts III.C-D. Similarly, from the
creditor side, the developing country debt crisis led the U.S. banking industry to "securitize third
world debt" by "pooling and repackaging [ ] loans into securities" to be "sold to investors."
Puchala, supra note 144, at 137.
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forgiveness conditions to debtors changing unrelated foreign policies.
Creditor state actions might be viewed as undermining the integrity of
the terms of the original debt and the continuity principle by evincing
enhanced interest to inject pressure in unrelated matters.
C. Precedent
Some precedent from tribunals supports ODD principles. 43 0 In the
United States, shortly after the 1837 economic panic, courts permitted
Arkansas, Florida, Michigan, and Mississippi to repudiate debts held by
foreign creditors because loan agreements lacked proper state
contracting authority and because the Eleventh Amendment provided
states with immunity from suits in federal court. 43 1 After the Civil War
(1861-65), the U.S. federal government required Confederate states to
renounce repayment on Cotton Bonds that were issued to financiers in
the northern states, Britain, and other countries.4 3 2 While the U.S.
Supreme Court has soundly affirmed creditor rights and prevented U.S.
states from repudiating debts, 43 3 a possible commonality with these
early American cases and ODD considerations is an aversion to foreign
intermeddling in domestic affairs during periods of nation-building.
At the international level, perhaps the most noteworthy example of
repudiation that resulted in precedent on the merits is the famous Tinoco
Arbitration in 1923. After gaining power through a controversial
election in April 1917, the Frederico Tinoco government in Costa Rica
borrowed substantial sums from the Royal Bank of Canada.4 34 The
successor government enacted the Law of Nullities No. 41 and spurned
Tinoco's loan agreements. 4 35 Britain, representing the Royal Bank of
Canada, argued that Costa Rica was bound to repay loans of the
predecessor government, while Costa Rica contended that the Tinoco
regime was not a defacto or dejure government and could not legally
436
Former
assume obligations to bind later Costa Rican governments.
President William Howard Taft, the sole arbiter, affirmed that
predecessor governments do bind later governments when accepting
obligations on behalf of a "state," but he also held that the transactions
429. Ordu, supra note 7, at 259-60 (citing Jeffrey Sachs for noting that "debt reduction
targets were set and reset arbitrarily").
430. P6rez & Weissman, supra note 28, at 738.
431. Ludington et al., supra note 341, at 269-72.
432. Id. at 272-74; Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 734-36 (1868).
433. Louisiana ex rel. S. Bank v. Pillsbury, 105 U.S. 278 (1881); South Dakota v. North
Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1903).
434. Lienau, supra note 1, at 70-71, 82.
435. Great Britain v. Costa Rica, 1 R.I.A.A. 369 (1923), reprintedin 18 AM. J. INT'L L.
147 (1924).
436. Id. at 376-77.
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were not made on behalf of the state because the loan agreements were
"full of irregularities" and that bank officials were on notice that Tinoco
would use the money for personal use and not for "legitimate
governmental uses.A 37 The ruling provides precedent to support formal
"odious debt" repudiation 43 8 and for creditors to bear some responsibility for failing to exercise due diligence and abetting corruption or
human rights abuses. 4 39 However, the facts may be more extreme in
exhibiting clearer lender notice of embezzlement, while the more
common twentieth century corruption cases involved sovereign loan
agreements with funds that were partially allocated for a public purpose
and partially embezzled.o40
Despite some precedent of repudiation, supportive cases, and strong
scholarly arguments for an ODD, the status quo in diplomatic economic
relations is to presume validity of debt at government turnover.441
Territorial shifts during succession movements raise continuity of
obligation questions, predominately due to sovereignty status under
international law.44 2 Without repudiation or default, creditors have no
reason to hail a government into court. There may be fewer cases due to
U.S. government or private sector reinsurance that compensates upon
debtor government default, the ability to write off uncollectible debt, or
U.S. government Paris Club involvement in rescheduling loans.
Plaintiffs may be less likely to bring debt collection claims. Then, even
if a claim is filed, there may be significant personal and subject matter
jurisdiction, comity, act of state doctrine, political questions 443 and
437. Id. at 394; Lienau, supra note 1, at 83 (stating that Taft questioned the legitimacy of
the Tinoco government and placed the burden of proof on the bank to prove "actual furnishing
of money to the government for its legitimate use."); Ludington et al., supra note 341, at 25868; see generally Fantaye,supra note 88.
438. Anderson, supra note 39, at 437.
439. Michalowski & Bohoslavsky, supra note 1, at 98, 102-03; Bohoslavsky &
Opgenhaffen, supra note 310, at 160-61, 182-83.
440. Buchheit et al., supranote 1, at 1219; Mugasha, supra note 68, at 861.
441. In 2004, creditors won judgments in New York against the Argentine government for
failure to pay external debt. Porzecanski, supra note 234, at 327. In the United States, creditors
were also successful against Bolivia (2002) and Brazil (1995). Mugasha, supra note 68, at 870;
Arewa, supra note 156, at 650-51. In England, creditors won cases against the Republic of
Congo (2006), Yemen (2001), and Zambia (1997).
442. See supra Parts IV.A-B.
443. Issues of judiciallexecutive branch conflict were raised in 1983 creditor bank suit
against the Costa Rican government as it ceased payment on external debts due to growing
economic crisis. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago (Allied 1), 566 F.
Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), vacated,757 F.2d 516, 519 (2d Cir. 1985); Shafter, supra note 1,
at 674. It is debatable whether ODD would be viewed as a political question because private
lending to a foreign government may not necessarily exclude an American court from
jurisdiction because there may be no interference with executive branch diplomatic relations.
See Republic of Phil. v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 359-60 (2d Cir. 1986). Individual cases could
present political questions. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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sovereign immunity questions. 444

VI.

CONCLUSION:

A PROPOSED TEST

There are deeper interactions among international law, macroeconomics, and contract law than the circumstances that initiated ODD
discussions. Maintaining existing debt from private loans while
relinquishing debt from sovereign-held loans does not apply the most
rudimentary, uncontroversial, and core ODD element of whether value
was provided. Moreover, encumbering oil-rich Iraq with new commercial debt, while constructing a model of open market globalization
under military occupation, is not analogous to the circumstances that
most developing countries confront. Also, Iraq's "statehood" was never
fractured under international law in the traditional sense of borders
shifting and the drastic movement from being closed to economicallyopen after lifting sanctions can be distinguished from the more common
ODD precedent.
The pertinent inquiry for developing countries is the nexus between
unsavory agents who accepted loans decades ago and mounting state
obligations. An ODD test, suitable for common law and equity
examination and adapted to modem day circumstances, with three
elements is proposed. First, political leaders unreasonably breached
fiduciary obligations to the population and external influences, such as
from dominant states and lenders, compromised that fiduciary
relationship and bypassed a debtor state population's rational interest.
Second, loan disbursement defects indicate that the population did not
receive adequate value in exchange for the obligations imposed. Third,
there were adverse consequences, which may include the vivid and
traditional concern of funding abuses to retain power or even of acting
carelessly in aggregating debt, the latter of which may be a consequence
of and affect the former two elements.
For the first element, abusive, kleptocratic dictatorships that
absconded with public funds and left repayment obligations with the
citizenry provide persuasive evidence that voluntary popular consent to
controversial government actions was bypassed. However, rather than
transfixing on brutal dictator agents and captive principals, which is a
rather high threshold for breach of fiduciary obligations under agency
law, another perspective is to assess a populace's rational self-interest
and consider whether political leaders prudently pursued those interests.
When international lending escalated in the 1970s, fundamental
444. Chander, supra note 8, at 1209; Buchheit, supra note 383, at 335; Sylvester, supra
note 10, at 291-95. Exceptions to sovereign immunity exist. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976).
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interests for populations were to economically develop and alleviate
poverty. Leaders offered a range of approaches for development.
Globalization was ultimately prudent, but during that process, foreign
relations might have urged unwise fiscal decision-making or even
undermined self-determination and voluntariness. One example is that
of annexing economic policymaking to security threats. For ODD
inquiries, implicitly rationalizing the legitimacy of relations between
dominant powers and questionable leaders/agents premised on security
threats should be extracted from ODD financial inquiries, but foreign
assistance seems abundantly relevant in assessing whether debtorpopulace rational choice could have been undermined to incline
conditions for subsequent mounting obligations.
The second element-a lack of value provided from the original loan
agreement-should neither pry open circumstances in which present
day creditors consternate over drastically increased lending risk, nor
unreasonably presume that past lending was always conducted
pristinely or fairly. Whether financial obligations were imposed without
delivering sufficient economic value is a fact-intensive question for the
debtor country. The query requires examining the history of financial
accounts, analyzing the extent to which value was provided, assessing
how accounts progressed, determining whether refinancing or commoditizing debt obfuscated defects in the original loan, and reconsidering
the macroeconomic impact as payments offset revenues on national
accounts. If facts are supportive, then it is possible that commercial and
international law remedial exceptions, which are mutually-consistent
with ODD elements, could question the original obligation and be
available without presuming creditors must initiate such actions as a
gratuity.
The third element is debt aggregation, which is the continuity of the
debt flowing from the original loan principal (element two). There are
many reasons that this was a substantial focus of this Article. Existing
ODD formulations provide assessments of how to construe the validity
of the original loan principal. However, if only loan principal was at
stake, obligations would probably not be noticed or questioned. Instead,
aggregating financial obligations progressed into the developing world
debt crisis and economic hardship may be the flag that today makes
ODD desirable, and even warrants a search for imprudent agents.
Century-old ODD formulations preceded the evolution of today's
system of globalization, and therefore did not contemplate systemic
features that could impact the status quo presumption of continuity of
financial obligations at government turnover. While continuity of debt
is firmly supported by core international law principles such as state
recognition, sovereignty, pacta sunt servanda, and adherence to
international institutions, complications arise due to power dominance,
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self-determination, and whether economic conditions are domesticallycontrollable. Amassing external obligations may, in some circumstances, have caused drastic government succession shifts that pitted
populace self-determination against systemically-solid financial
obligations.
The search for custom and general principles of law relating to debt
continuity involved drastic institutional changes and competing
precedent. Even at the turn of the twentieth century, powerful countries
employed force over colonies and weaker territories to collect financial
obligations. International institutions dispensed with those practices.
The United Nations was formed to avoid use of force, end colonialism
and affirm self-determination, sovereignty, and a system of coequal
states. The IMF promoted currency cooperation and the Gold Standard
collateralized accounting debts by backing financial value exchanges
with a valuable commodity. The end of the Gold Standard coincided
with "loan pushing," increased energy prices, and high inflation. With
regard to the status of foreign property rights and collecting on
obligations owed, without a valuable asset collateralizing debts, state
promises were barer, but were still backed by comity, contractual
morality, and IMF membership to reduce default risk.
After debts mounted, creditor country and IMF initiatives during the
1980s and 1990s favored shifting from debt-to-equity and urging
privatizations, which commoditized a stronger form of property rights
in conjunction with favoritism for freer currency conversion to support
market price exchange rates. Prescriptions did not always alleviate
unsustainable debt problems. By comparison, domestic corporate law
may permit shareholders with means of questioning imprudent
executive/management; and mergers, acquisitions, bankruptcy, windups, and chartering a corporation modify corporate form and financial
accounts. However, except for the rare circumstance of state
transformations, international law solidifies state obligations and
sovereignty. The perpetual person status lowered risk of sovereign
lending, while repayment obligations perdure as a macroeconomic
effect on the entire economy.
The 1990s currency crises highlight market imperfections and may
suggest that pacta sunt servanda as applied to international
jurisprudence on financial obligations should not be tantamount to the
level of solidity and continuity afforded to other international law
obligations, such as rules that prohibit engaging in illegal wars and
torture. Financial obligations can drastically increase with devaluation
from floating exchange rates and computerized international block
currency trading, which thereby aggregates public debt since portions of
current account debits service loan obligations. High debt may even
make currencies more risky or reduce leverage to dissent against
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hegemonic discourse and creditor country economic panaceas.
Annexing this progression of macroeconomic influences is pertinent to
ODD inquiries, but is a fact-intensive causation question for debtor
countries.
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